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"PARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION AND THE
HEALTH EXCEPTION: PROTECTING
MATERNAL HEALTH OR
RISKING ABORTION
ON DEMAND?
Gail Glidewell*
Because even the compelling interest of the State in protecting po-
tential life after fetal viability was held [in Roe] to be insufficient
to outweigh a woman's decision to protect her life or health, it
could be argued that the freedom of a woman to decide whether
to terminate her pregnancy for health reasons does in fact lie at
the core of the constitutional liberty identified in [Roe].'
INTRODUCTION
In the first debate of the 2000 presidential election, President
George W. Bush stated, "[W]e need to ban partial birth abortions
.... [doing so] would be a positive step toward reducing the num-
ber of abortions in America."' 2 Former Vice President Albert Gore
stated, however, "[O]n the issue of partial birth or so-called late-
term abortion, I would sign a law banning that procedure, provided
that doctors have the ability to save a woman's life or to act if her
health is severely at risk."' 3 This rhetoric captures the essence of
one of the most contentious constitutional issues currently facing
American courts-the legality of statutes banning the medical pro-
* J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 2002; B.A., Political Science, summa
cum laude, Fordham University. I would like to thank Professor Charles M. Whelan,
S.J., for his wisdom, time, patience, and guidance. I also would like to thank Gerard
A. Imperato, and Professors Susan A. Beck and Thomas DeLuca, for sparking my
interest in the law and for encouraging me to take risks. Thanks to the editors and
staff members of the Fordham Urban Law Journal who took the time to help me with
my Note. I dedicate this Note to my family and friends for their love, support, and
sacrifice. All I am and will ever become is because of them.
1. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (holding that a state that partici-
pates in the Medicaid program is not obligated under Title XIX of the Social Security
Act to continue to fund those medically necessary abortions for which federal reim-
bursement was unavailable under the Hyde Amendment, the 1976 amendment to Ti-
tle XIX severely limiting the use of any federal funds to reimburse the cost of
abortions under the Medicaid program).
2. Transcript of Debate Between Vice President Gore and Governor Bush, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 4, 2000, at A31.
3. Id.
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cedure, intact dilation and extraction ("D&X"), or the so-called
partial birth abortion procedure.4 The rhetoric also highlights a
specific issue that courts have explored in the course of their in-
quiries into what I will term "the partial birth abortion question,"
that is, what role the "maternal health exception" will play in fu-
ture court decisions on the constitutionality of partial birth abor-
tion bans. This Note explores the implications of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Stenberg v. Carhart to invalidate a Ne-
braska statute banning partial birth abortion.5 Specifically, this
Note focuses on one of the rationales the Court offered for its deci-
sion to invalidate the statute: the statute's failure to contain an ex-
ception to the ban for instances in which abortions are medically
necessary to protect the health of the woman.6 The majority held
that the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban required a health ex-
ception.7 However, the majority provided few clear guidelines
specifying the requirements of such a health exception.8
4. The dilation and extraction procedure ("D&X") is a rarely used second tri-
mester abortion procedure, accounting for approximately only one percent of all
abortions performed after twenty-one weeks of pregnancy, or approximately only
0.01% of all abortions performed annually. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2608
(2000); Ann MacLean Massie, So-Called "Partial-Birth Abortion" Bans: Bad
Medicine? Maybe. Bad Law? Definitely, 59 U. PITr. L. REV. 301, 317-18 (1998) (argu-
ing that partial birth abortion bans are highly "constitutionally suspect" because of
their vague language, lack of an exception for the health of the woman, and probable
violation of Casey's undue burden standard). For a more detailed discussion of the
D&X procedure, see infra Part I.A. Opponents of late term abortion rights refer to
the D&X procedure publicly as "partial birth" abortion. Linda Greenhouse, The Su-
preme Court: The Nebraska Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2000, at Al (discussing the
Supreme Court's Stenberg v. Carhart decision and background to partial birth abor-
tion bans). Pro-choice advocates, however, prefer to use the medical term, D&X. Id. I
will use the term "partial birth" abortion throughout this Note because it is, for better
or worse, how the procedure has come to be known and called by the public, press,
and academia. For a more detailed discussion of the term, see infra Part I.A.
5. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000).
6. Id. at 2613. The Carhart Court also held that a statute that seeks to ban a
particular abortion procedure must not contain any vague language. Id. at 2614. The
statute must make clear, through its "plain language," exactly which procedure(s) it
"[is] intended to apply" to (in particular, "whether the law was intended to apply only
to" the D&X procedure). Id. The majority held that because the language of the Ne-
braska statute prohibited the D&X, as well as the dilation and evacuation ("D&E")
procedure, the most common pre-viability, second trimester abortion procedure, the
statute imposed an undue burden on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion. Id. at
2617. The vagueness prong of the Carhart decision is beyond the scope of this Note,
and will be discussed only briefly infra Part I.A.
7. Carhart, 120. S. Ct. at 2613.
8. Id. at 2609-613.
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Prior to Carhart, approximately thirty states had statutes ban-
ning partial birth abortion.9 Only two of those statutes contained
an exception for the health of the woman.10 After Carhart, it is
highly likely that when confronted with the same set of circum-
stances as Carhart, future courts will require statutes banning par-
tial birth abortion to contain health exceptions. Court battles
likely will focus, in large part, on what provisions health exceptions
should contain, and on how such provisions should be interpreted.
However, just as abortion jurisprudence has evolved along with
changes in medical knowledge, social, political, and moral stan-
dards, and the composition of the Supreme Court, future court de-
cisions on the constitutionality of partial birth abortion bans will be
shaped by similar changes.
The Carhart decision undoubtedly influenced President Bush
and former Vice President Gore's statements supra. Their state-
ments suggest several compelling questions such as: Will the Su-
preme Court still require partial birth abortion bans to contain
health exceptions if it is faced with different circumstances than
those faced by the Carhart Court? What are the implications of
requiring a health exception in statutes banning partial birth abor-
tion? What provisions will future courts require, or prohibit, in
health exceptions? Will a health exception in a partial birth abor-
tion ban risk abuse and endless exceptions to the rule?
These questions are important because debate over the constitu-
tional limit on reproductive freedom as it pertains to abortion, or
what I term "the abortion issue," has been a conspicuous part of
the political landscape since even before the 1973 decision Roe v.
Wade. The controversy over partial birth abortion is the most cur-
rent manifestation of this debate. Like Roe in 1973, Carhart in
2000 was the culmination of several lower court challenges to state
and federal abortion statutes.11 Both decisions were also the em-
9. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al.
10. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15
(West 1995) (repealed 1997). The Ohio statute was found unconstitutional by the
Sixth Circuit in Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Sixth Circuit invalidated the statute because it found its language unconstitution-
ally vague, and because it contained medical emergency and health exception provi-
sions that did not consider mental health risks. For a detailed discussion of the
Voinovich court's analysis on the statute's health exception, see infra Parts II.B.l.a.ii.,
II.B.l.b, II.B.2.b., and II.B.3.a.
11. E.g., Eubanks v. Stengel, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000) (invalidating Kentucky
statute banning "partial birth" abortion that was similar in language to the Nebraska
statute in Carhart, as unconstitutionally overbroad in light of the Court's Carhart deci-
sion); Carhart v. Stenberg, 192 F.3d 1142 (8th Cir. 1999), affd, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000)
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bodiment of much more: contemporary moral values, the place of
religion in constitutional inquiries into the right to abortion, and
the role of each gender in defining and shaping that right.'2 Just as
Roe was only the beginning of the national debate on abortion,
Carhart is undoubtedly only the beginning of a national debate on
partial birth abortion. Similarly, just as Roe did not conclusively
settle the abortion issue, neither has Carhart conclusively settled
the partial birth abortion issue. Although seemingly only a small
piece of the issue, how future courts interpret the health exception
in statutes banning partial birth abortion certainly will affect in
fundamental ways the overall course of the controversy. How
courts interpret maternal "health" will shape future abortion juris-
prudence, and will alter the meaning of the right to abortion for
future generations of women.
(invalidating Nebraska statute banning "partial birth" abortion because statute im-
posed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose to have an abortion); Little
Rock Family Planning Servs., P.A. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999) (invalidating
Arkansas statute banning "partial birth" abortion because statute was unconstitution-
ally overbroad and placed an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain an abor-
tion); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 144 F.3d 326 (4th Cir. 1998)
(reversing denial of stay on preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Virginia
statute banning "partial birth" abortion, in part, because statute was not unconstitu-
tionally vague); Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463 (7th Cir. 1998)
(invalidating Wisconsin statute banning "partial birth" abortion because statute was
unconstitutionally vague and had no exception for the health of the woman), rev'd en
banc, The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999) (upholding Illinois and
Wisconsin statutes banning "partial birth" abortion because statutes could be inter-
preted to avoid vagueness and thus did not impose an undue burden on a woman's
right to abortion); Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir.
1997) (invalidating Ohio law banning pre- and post-viability "partial birth" abortion
procedures because the law was unconstitutionally vague and contained medical
emergency and health exception provisions that did not consider mental health risks);
Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (affirming
decision that abortion providers stated constitutional undue burden claims when they
challenged Alabama statutes banning "partial birth" and post-viability abortions),
aff'd and rev'd on other grounds, Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326
(11th Cir. 1999); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (invalidating
Michigan statute banning "partial birth" abortion because statute was unconstitution-
ally vague and imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to have an abortion);
Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997)
(invalidating statute banning "partial birth" abortion, in part, because statute was un-
constitutionally vague and imposed an undue burden on a woman's ability to obtain
an abortion).
12. Court battles over the constitutionality of abortion are fraught with ethical
conflicts. The Supreme Court has acknowledged "the 'treacherous grounds we tread
when we undertake to translate ethical concepts into legal ones, case by case."'
United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 79 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (quot-
ing Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223, 242 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting)).
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This Note analyzes the central role of women's health in the de-
bate over the limits of abortion rights, and how courts have invali-
dated or upheld abortion statutes based on whether they pose a
risk to women's health.13 Part I of this Note provides a back-
ground on the current state of the partial birth abortion contro-
versy, focusing specifically on how the health exception issue fits
into this controversy. It also discusses Supreme Court case law
comprising the foundation of the abortion and partial birth abor-
tion debates, the current state of the law on the health exception,
and the policy considerations underlying the debate. Part II
presents the central controversy, which has two prongs: (A)
whether, after Carhart, courts always will require statutes banning
partial birth abortion to contain an exception for the health of the
woman, and (B) what courts will require a health exception to con-
tain to pass constitutional muster. Prong (B) is broken down into
three controversial issues courts have focused on when analyzing
health exceptions in abortion statutes: (1) the meaning and scope
of the term "health," (2) the required severity of the risk to the
woman's health, and (3) whether a subjective or an objective stan-
dard should be applied to determine when a woman's health is at
risk.
Part III argues that future courts likely will require statutes ban-
ning partial birth abortion always to contain an exception for the
health of the woman. Part III then argues, first, that although state
legislatures should draft health exceptions that broadly define
"health," more narrow interpretations of "health" probably will be
upheld by future courts. Second, although state legislatures should
require a woman's health to be at serious risk, the controversial
nature of partial birth abortion may result in courts upholding
stricter severity requirements. Third, courts should strike a reason-
able balance and rely on a mixed subjective and objective standard
to determine when a woman's health is at risk. This Note con-
cludes that this proposal must be balanced against many unpredict-
able forces, including changes in political leadership in the
executive and legislative branches, changes in the composition of
the Supreme Court, and advances in medicine. Moreover, much of
13. Courts have not interpreted abortion statutes with only the state interest in
protecting maternal health in mind. As will become clear in the following Parts of this
Note, courts have considered other state interests in the course of passing judgment
on abortion statutes. Nonetheless, the interest in the "preservation of the life or
health of the mother" has never been obviated by other interests, and has never, prior
to the partial birth abortion debate, resulted in courts upholding abortion statutes that
lacked a health exception. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973); infra Parts 1-111.
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the case law in this area is new, and older case law only recently
has been applied to challenges to partial birth abortion bans. Thus,
any predictions and conclusions are, necessarily, conditional.
I. FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEBATE
Future court decisions on partial birth abortion bans, and
whether and what kind of a "maternal health exception" will be
required in partial birth abortion bans, will have strong policy im-
plications for the resolution of other aspects of the debate over
abortion rights. Opponents of so-called partial birth abortion often
stress what they believe to be the heinous nature of partial birth
abortion procedures,14 as well as the moral differences between the
partial birth abortion method and other abortion methods.' 5 De-
fenders of this medical procedure argue that maintaining the op-
tion of partial birth abortion is necessary if "choice"-a woman's
right of whether or when to have an abortion-is to remain mean-
ingful. 6 Moreover, defenders of the procedure argue that banning
partial birth abortion puts the health of certain women at risk.' 7
Therefore, opponents and defenders will watch closely any court
decisions that appear to strengthen or weaken the legality of par-
tial birth abortion. This Part will provide a brief background of the
controversy and explain how the health exception issue relates to
this controversy. It also will discuss the Supreme Court decisions
that provide the foundation for a health exception requirement in
abortion regulations, the current state of the law on the health ex-
ception, and where the controversy appears to be heading.
14. E.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("The
State chose to forbid a procedure many decent and civilized people find so abhorrent
as to be among the most serious crimes against human life .... ").
15. E.g., id. at 2626 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Nebraska was entitled to find the
existence of a consequential moral difference between the procedures."); Green-
house, supra note 4, at Al (quoting James Bopp, General Counsel for the National
Right to Life Committee, calling the Carhart decision a "radical expansion of the right
to abortion"); Nat Hentoff, Close to Infanticide, WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1996, at A31
(arguing that partial birth abortion is akin to infanticide).
16. E.g., Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (remarking that
"partial birth" abortion bans are enacted to "chip away at the private choice shielded
by Roe v. Wade, even as modified by Casey").
17. Hentoff, supra note 15 ("[Slupporters . . . claim [partial birth abortions] are
performed only when the fetus is severely deformed and could cause great harm to
the mother or even her death.").
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A. The "Partial Birth" Abortion Procedure and General
Background of the Debate
In order to understand the nature of this controversy, one must
first understand the actual procedures and terminology at issue.
The term, "partial birth" abortion, is not a medically recognized
term.18 It is a term created in the mid-1990s by opponents of abor-
tion to describe a method of abortion that doctors generally use to
terminate pregnancies that have progressed longer than approxi-
mately sixteen weeks. 19 The term was selected in the hope that the
graphic images of the procedure it conjures up would help to un-
dermine public support for abortion rights.20 Partial birth abortion
is, nonetheless, understood in the medical community to mean a
certain method of second trimester, late-term abortion referred to
as an "intact dilation and extraction" ("D&X") procedure. 21 Doc-
tors perform the D&X procedure only after approximately the six-
teenth week of pregnancy when the fetus's skull is too large to fit
safely through an undilated cervix.22 The D&X procedure is per-
18. E.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1376
(D. Ariz. 1997) ("The term 'partial birth abortion' is not a medical term which is used
in the field of obstetrics/gynecology.").
19. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al. To place partial birth abortion in context, it
is useful to provide some statistics on the performance of abortion procedures in the
United States. About ninety percent of all abortions in the United States take place
during the first trimester, before the twelfth week of pregnancy. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at
2605. During the first trimester, the most common abortion method is the "vacuum
aspiration" method, which involves insertion of a vacuum tube into the uterus to
evacuate the contents. Id. However, as the fetus grows in size, the vacuum aspiration
method becomes difficult to use. Id. at 2606. About ten percent of all abortions are
performed during the second trimester, from twelve to twenty-four weeks of preg-
nancy. Id. During this period, the most common method of abortion used, as dis-
cussed in the text, is the "dilation and evacuation" ("D&E") procedure. Id.; infra note
29 and accompanying text. D&E accounts for approximately ninety-five percent of all
abortions performed from twelve to twenty weeks of pregnancy. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at
2606. The D&X procedure also is performed during the second trimester, but to a far
lesser extent than D&E. See id. at 2608. Only about one percent of all abortions are
performed after twenty-one weeks of pregnancy, and D&X accounts for approxi-
mately only one percent of these abortions, or aproximately 0.01% of all abortions
performed annually. Massie, supra note 4, at 317-18. Lastly, only about 0.04% of all
abortions are performed after twenty-six weeks. Id.
20. Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al.
21. Maureen L. Rurka, Comment, The Vagueness of Partial-Birth Abortion Bans:
Deconstruction or Destruction?, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1233, 1236 (1999)
("In refusing to grant the legislatures th[e] leeway in drafting the partial-birth abor-
tion bans, the thirteen federal courts that have struck down or enjoined enforcement
of these bans on void-for-vagueness grounds have done a disservice to the principles
of federalism.").
22. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2607.
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formed very rarely.23 Although no reliable statistics exist on the
number of D&X abortions performed annually, it is estimated that,
of all abortions performed after twenty-one weeks (approximately
one percent of all abortions performed in the United States), D&X
represents only about one percent.24 In a D&X abortion, doctors
try to keep the fetus as intact as possible. They extract the fetus
feet-first,2 6 and then use a sharp instrument to collapse the fetal
skull.27 The procedure typically involves: (1) deliberate dilation of
the cervix, usually over a period of days, (2) instrumental conver-
sion of the fetus to a footling position, (3) breech extraction of the
body excepting the head, and (4) partial evacuation of the in-
tracranial contents of the fetus "to effect vaginal delivery of a dead
but otherwise intact fetus. '28
The most common second trimester abortion procedure used is
called "dilation and evacuation" ("D&E"), a variation of the D&X
procedure. 29 D&E generally is used in the period between twelve
and twenty-four weeks of pregnancy,30 and accounts for approxi-
mately ninety-five percent of all abortions performed between
twelve and twenty weeks of pregnancy. 31 The D&E procedure typ-
ically involves: (1) dilation of the cervix, (2) removal of at least
23. Id. at 2608 (estimating range as from 640 to 5000 D&X procedures performed
per year).
24. Id.; Massie, supra note 4, at 317-18 (estimating that D&X represents only
about one percent of all abortions performed after twenty-one weeks of pregnancy, or
aproximately 0.01% of all abortions performed annually).
25. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2608.
26. Technically, "intact D&E" can proceed in one of two ways depending on how
the fetus presents, head or feet first. Id. at 2607. It is the breech-extraction version of
intact D&E that is commonly known as the D&X procedure. Id. The two procedures
are, however, "sufficiently similar for us to use the terms interchangeably." Id. at
2608.
27. Id. at 2607.
28. Id. at 2608 (quoting AM. COLL. OF OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS EXEC-
UTIVE BD., STATEMENT ON INTACT DILATION AND EXTRACTION 599-60 (1997)).
There are, in addition, other abortion methods that are used during the second trimes-
ter. See Rebecca L. Andrews, Note, The Unconstitutionality of State Legislation Ban-
ning "Partial-Birth" Abortion, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 521, 528-29 (1999) (arguing that
state legislation attempting to ban partial birth abortion is unconstitutional based on
Supreme Court precedent). These methods include the "instillation" or "induction"
methods, which involve simulation of labor by the removal of amniotic fluid in vary-
ing amounts and the instillation of saline in utereo; "hysterotomy," a pre-term
Cesarean section; and, "hysterectomy," the removal of the uterus. Id. However, be-
cause all of these procedures often result in severe complications to the pregnant
woman, they are rarely used as abortion procedures. Id.
29. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2606.
30. Id.
31. Id.
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some fetal tissue using non-vacuum instruments, and (3) (after fif-
teen weeks) the potential need for instrumental disarticulation or
dismemberment of the fetus or the collapse of fetal parts to facili-
tate evacuation from the uterus.32 Dismemberment generally oc-
curs when the doctor pulls a portion of the fetus into the birth
canal.33
The main difference between the D&E and D&X procedures is
that the D&X procedure involves "removing the fetus from the
uterus through the cervix 'intact,' e.g., in one pass, rather than in
several passes," as in the D&E procedure. 34 The rationale for asso-
ciating the D&X, and not the D&E procedure, with "partial birth"
abortion generally has been that because the fetus is delivered in-
tact in a D&X procedure, "the child is delivered completely out of
the uterus and the vagina," thus provoking some to term the proce-
dure "partial birth infanticide. ' 35
The majority of court battles over the constitutionality of stat-
utes banning partial birth abortion have focused on whether stat-
utes purporting to ban only the D&X procedure could be
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2607.
35. Jill R. Radloff, Note, Partial-Birth Infanticide: An Alternative Legal and Medi-
cal Route to Banning Partial-Birth Procedures, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1555, 1556, 1558
(1999) (suggesting that partial birth abortion bans should be replaced by partial birth
infanticide bans because the latter "make[ ] it more likely that these statutes will be
found constitutional because such bans neither infringe upon the right of a woman to
choose to have an abortion nor are they unconstitutionally vague"). There has been
thought-provoking discussion suggesting that the legal distinction between the D&X
and D&E procedures is irrational and fails to accomplish any compelling state inter-
ests in regulating abortion. E.g., Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2617 (Stevens, J., concurring).
For example, in his concurring opinion in Carhart, Justice Stevens questioned whether
banning only one of "these two equally gruesome procedures" furthers any legitimate
state interests at all. Id. He described the distinction as "simply irrational." Id.; see
also id. at 2620 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("[T]his law [the Nebraska statute] does not
save any fetus from destruction, for it only targets a method of performing abortion
... [nior does the statute seek to protect the lives or health of pregnant women.")
(citations omitted) (emphasis in original). For an in-depth discussion on the irrational-
ity of the legal distinction between the D&E and D&X procedures, see The Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 881 (7th Cir. 1999) (Posner, J., dissenting) (observing
that laws that prohibit the D&X and not the D&E procedure do so "not because the
procedure [D&X] kills the fetus, not because it risks worse complications for the wo-
man than alternative procedures would do, [and] not because it is a crueler or more
painful or more disgusting method of terminating a pregnancy . . ."), vacated,
Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000); Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162
F.3d 463, 467 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding, in part, that a Wisconsin law purporting to ban
only the D&X procedure failed to accomplish any recognizable state interests), rev'd
en banc, The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999).
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interpreted also to ban the D&E procedure.36 A ban on D&E
would ban the most common second-trimester abortion proce-
dure.37 The Carhart Court,38 as well as the vast majority of lower
courts prior to Carhart, found that a ban on both procedures would
make it almost impossible for a woman to obtain a safe second
trimester abortion.39 For example, in Carhart, the Nebraska statute
defined partial birth abortion as "an abortion procedure in which
the person performing the abortion partially delivers vaginally a
living unborn child before killing the unborn child and completing
the delivery."4  The statute then defined "partially delivers
vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child" to
mean "deliberately and intentionally delivering into the vagina a
living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the pur-
pose of performing a procedure that the person performing the
procedure knows will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn
child."'"
The attorney general of Nebraska argued that the statute banned
only the use of the D&X procedure, and not the more common
D&E procedure.42 The Carhart Court held, however, that the stat-
ute was unconstitutional because its language was too vague and
applied, in practice, to both procedures. 3 Because D&E is the
most common second trimester abortion procedure, a statute inter-
preted as banning both the D&E and D&X procedures would im-
pose an unconstitutional burden on a woman seeking an
abortion.44 Similar vagueness analyses were used by many of the
lower courts prior to Carhart, often involving statutes with the ex-
act or very similar language as the Nebraska statute in Carhart.45
36. E.g., Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1377
(D. Ariz. 1997) (analyzing whether the language of the Arizona "partial birth" abor-
tion statute banned only the D&X procedure, or the D&E procedure as well); Doyle,
162 F.3d at 469 (analyzing whether a statute that purported to ban only the D&X
procedure could be constitutionally interpreted not also to ban the D&E procedure
so as to avoid vagueness).
37. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2606.
38. Infra Part I.B.4 far a detailed discussion of Carhart.
39. Infra note 45 for examples of such cases.
40. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2605.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 2614.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2617.
45. E.g., Eubanks v. Stengel, 224 F.3d 576 (6th Cir. 2000) (invalidating Kentucky
"partial birth" abortion ban, which described the procedure using language such as
"substantial portion thereof," as unconstitutionally overbroad); Planned Parenthood
of Greater Iowa, Inc. v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1999) ("The physician does
1098
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If a statute's language is not vague and applies only to the D&X
procedure, courts then look to whether a D&X procedure requires
an exception for the health of the woman. For instance, the Car-
hart Court's other main reason for invalidating the Nebraska stat-
ute was that the statute did not contain a health exception.46 Prior
to Carhart, only two partial birth abortion bans contained health
exceptions. 47 The vast majority of the lower federal courts that ad-
dressed the health exception issue prior to Carhart concluded that
statutes banning partial birth abortion required a health excep-
tion.4" One court even invalidated one of the two state statutes
that contained a health exception, in large part, because the court
found the statute's health exception inadequate.49
not have to intend to perform a 'partial-birth abortion,' as that phrase has been popu-
larly used, to violate the Act. Simply intending to deliver a part of the fetus into the
vagina, as part of the abortion procedure, while the fetus is still intact and living, is
enough."); Planned Parenthood of S. Ariz., Inc. v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D.
Ariz. 1997) ("[T]he Court concludes that the term 'partial birth abortion' is defined in
such a way that a 'persons [sic] of common intelligence would necessarily guess at
meaning and differ as to application."); Evans v. Kelley, 977 F. Supp. 1283, 1305 (E.D.
Mich. 1997) ("The experts differed widely as to what they understood 'partially
vaginally delivers a living fetus' to mean .... [I]t was not clear to them whether the
term meant partially delivering an intact fetus or delivering a part of a fragmented
fetus or both situations.").
46. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
47. Supra note 10; Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al.
48. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Doyle, 162 F.3d 463,466-69 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that Supreme Court precedent requires statutes banning "partial birth"
abortion to contain exceptions for the health of the woman), rev'd en banc, The Hope
Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857 (7th Cir. 1999); Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. James, 984
F. Supp. 1404, 1460 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that the complete lack of a health
exception in post-viability "partial birth" abortion ban had "the effect of limiting the
woman's, and her doctor's, choice of an appropriate abortion method .. ."), affid and
rev'd on other grounds, Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir.
1999); Woods, 982 F. Supp. at 1378 (invalidating statute banning "partial birth" abor-
tion, in part, because statute did not contain an exception for the health of the wo-
man). Contra The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 873 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that
because "the D&X procedure is not essential to protect the health of any woman,
given the availability of other procedures," a "case-by-case" health exception is not
required in a ban on the D&X procedure), vacated, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct.
2597 (2000).
49. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997) (striking
down ban on D&X, in part, because ban's health exception did not consider mental
health risks).
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B. The Foundation of the Health Exception in
Abortion Jurisprudence
1. Roe v. Wade: Writing Maternal Health Into the Constitution
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a Texas criminal abortion statute that proscribed procuring
or attempting an abortion except for the purpose of saving the wo-
man's life °.5 The Court grounded its decision in the constitutional
right to privacy, holding that, "this right of privacy . . . is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to termi-
nate her pregnancy." 51 The Court held that the right to an abor-
tion was fundamental 52 and any abridgment on the right was
subject to strict judicial scrutiny53 limited only by a compelling
state interest.54 The Court found, however, that a woman's right to
terminate her pregnancy was not absolute. The state had two
"important and legitimate interest[s]" at stake: (1) preserving the
health of the pregnant woman, and (2) "protecting the potentiality
of human life."' 56 These state interests grew in importance as a wo-
man's pregnancy progressed.57
The Roe Court grounded the abortion right, in large part, in
what it believed to be the state's compelling obligation to protect
maternal health.58 The majority provided a broad interpretation of
maternal health:5 9
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant
woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent. Specific
and direct harm medically diagnosable even in early pregnancy
may be involved. Maternity, or additional offspring, may force
upon the woman a distressful life and future. Psychological
harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be
taxed by child care.6"
50. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18, 164 (1973).
51. Id. at 153.
52. Id. at 155.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 153.
56. Id. at 162. The Roe Court also remarked that the state had an interest in
"maintaining medical standards." Id. at 154.
57. Id. at 162.
58. Id. at 153.
59. See id.
60. Id.
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The Roe majority constructed a trimester framework that bal-
anced a woman's right to abortion against the state's interests.61
The majority built this trimester framework around the health and
well-being of the pregnant woman as the "paramount" concern.62
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the woman, in consultation
with her physician, was "free to determine, without regulation by
the State" (except for requiring that abortions be performed by a
licensed physician), and in her physician's medical judgment, that
her pregnancy should be terminated. 63 The earliest "compelling"
point at which the state could act to protect its legitimate interests
was at approximately the end of the first trimester and throughout
the second trimester.64 During this time, the state could regulate
abortions to "the extent that the regulation reasonably relates to
the preservation and protection of maternal health. ' 65 The Court
provided examples of such regulations, including imposing qualifi-
cation and licensing requirements on people performing abortions,
regulating abortion facilities (e.g., whether abortions must take
place in hospitals or clinics), and regulating the licensing of such
facilities.66
It was only at the point of viability,67 at approximately the begin-
ning of the third trimester, that the state's interest in potential life
became determinatively compelling. 68 At this point, the state
could go so far as to proscribe abortion outright.69 However, even
in the third trimester, the state could not proscribe abortion
"where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the
preservation of the life or health of the mother. ' 7° In fact, the ma-
jority held that the Texas statute's lack of a health exception was
one of the main factors that rendered the statute
unconstitutional. 71
The Roe Court, however, did not intend for these trimesters to
be precise dividing lines for determining when the state's interests
61. See id. at 163-64.
62. See id.; Massie, supra note 4, at 357.
63. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. The Roe Court defined viability as the point at which the fetus "presumably
has the capability of meaningful life outside the mother's womb." Id.
68. Id. at 163-64.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 164-65.
71. Id. at 164.
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became compelling.7 2 Instead, they were approximations based on
medical knowledge existing at the time.73 The majority structured
its decision around two general "compelling points, ' 7a or dividing
lines, that correlated to the state's two legitimate interests: (1) the
point when mortality in an abortion procedure is greater than mor-
tality in normal childbirth (representing the state's interest in ma-
ternal health),75 and (2) the point of viability (representing the
state's interest in potential life).76 These two compelling points led
to certain conclusions. First, before viability, a state regulation was
justified only on the ground that it was necessary to protect against
an increased risk to the woman's health.77 Second, it was only at
the point of viability that the state's interest in potential life could
justify a proscription on abortion.78 Even at that point, however,
the state could not exercise its interest in potential life in a way that
put the woman's life or health at risk.79
The Roe Court granted a physician fairly broad discretion to de-
termine, "in consultation with his patient,"'80 whether a woman
should have an abortion. The Court held:
The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to
the points where important state interests provide compelling
justifications for intervention. Up to those points, the abortion
decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a medical
decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with the
physician.8
At the point where the state's interests becomes compelling, how-
ever, "the State [is] free to place increasing restrictions on abortion
as the period of pregnancy lengthens, so long as those restrictions
are tailored to the recognized state interests. ' 82 The state's interest
in potential fetal life, however, could never be strong enough to
justify imposing a regulation that put the "life" or "health" of the
woman at risk.83 Therefore, under Roe, an abortion regulation
72. Id. at 163.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 163-64.
80. Id. at 163.
81. Id. at 165-66.
82. Id. at 165.
83. Id. at 164-65.
2001] "PARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION AND HEALTH 1103
must protect the life or health of the mother at all stages of preg-
nancy, even post-viability.84
2. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey:
Affirming Roe's Health Exception
In the Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,85 the Joint Opinion86 altered
the abortion right as defined by Roe. It remained faithful, how-
84. See id.; see also Jennifer Landrum Elliott, Comment, Will Charlie Brown Fi-
nally Kick the Football?: Missouri Enacts the Next Generation of Partial Birth Abor-
tion Restrictions, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1083, 1102 (2000) (analyzing the confusion
surrounding the constitutionality of statutes banning partial birth abortion prior to the
Supreme Court's decision in Carhart).
85. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
86. There was no Opinion of the Court in Casey. Id. A "Joint Opinion" was signed
by Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy. Id. at 843. The Joint Opinion has, none-
theless, been recognized as the controlling opinion. E.g., Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1310 n.2 (1994) (Souter, J.) (treating the
Joint Opinion in Casey as controlling); Planned Parenthood, Sioux Falls Clinic v.
Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1456 n.7 (8th Cir. 1995) ("We view the [J]oint [O]pinion as the
Supreme Court's definitive statement of the constitutional law on abortion."); A Wo-
man's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp. 1434, 1444 (S.D.
Ind. 1995) ("That opinion [the Joint Opinion] ... states the controlling holdings of the
Court."). In this Note, "Joint Opinion" will refer to the opinion adopted by Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy. Whenever a part of the Joint Opinion was joined by
a majority of the justices, and is therefore part of the Opinion of the Court, it will be
so noted.
The Casey decision is complex because of its several concurring and dissenting
opinions. The following breakdown may be of assistance in understanding which pro-
visions of the Pennsylvania statute each justice would have upheld or invalidated.
I. The judgment: All of the provisions of the Pennsylvania abortion statute
were upheld as constitutional, except for the spousal notification provi-
sion (with a medical emergency exception) and related record-keeping
and reporting requirements. A breakdown of how the justices decided is
as follows:
A) O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter
1) Upheld as not imposing an undue burden:
a. Twenty-four hour waiting period with medical emergency ex-
ception. Casey, 505 U.S. at 879-80.
b. Informed consent requirement. Id. at 881-87.
c. Parental consent requirement with judicial by-pass option. Id.
at 899-900.
d. Record keeping and recording requirements. Id. at 900-01.
2) Invalidated as posing an undue burden:
a. Spousal notification provision (with medical emergency excep-
tion) and related record-keeping and reporting requirements.
Id. at 887-98, 901.
B) Stevens
1) Upheld as necessary for a compelling state interest:
a. Record keeping and recording requirements. Id. at 900-01.
b. Informed consent requirement (upheld some). Id. at 917-18.
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ever, to Roe's central holdings. In a part joined by a majority of
the justices, the Joint Opinion reaffirmed three central principles of
Roe. First, a woman has the right "to choose to have an abortion
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State" under the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments. 87 "Before viability, the state's interests are
not strong enough to support a prohibition of abortion or the im-
position of a substantial obstacle" on the woman's ability to effec-
tuate that right.88 Second, the Joint Opinion explicitly reaffirmed
Roe's recognition of the state's power to restrict, and even pro-
scribe abortions, after viability, "except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother."89 Third, the state has a legitimate interest,
from the outset of pregnancy, in protecting the health of the wo-
man and the potential life of the fetus.90
The Joint Opinion made clear, however, that although it was re-
affirming Roe's central holdings, it was "at the same time accom-
modating the State's profound interest in potential life . . "91 It
found that the state had legitimate interests in ensuring that the
c. Parental notification provision with judicial by-pass option. Id.
at 922 n.8.
2) Invalidated as not necessary for a compelling state interest:
a. Spousal notification provision (with a medical emergency ex-
ception) and related record keeping and reporting require-
ments. Id. at 887-98, 901.
b. TWenty-four hour waiting period with medical emergency ex-
ception. Id. at 918-20.
c. Informed consent requirement (invalidated some). Id. at 917-
18.
C) Blackmun
1) Invalidated all of the statute's provisions as not necessary for a
compelling state interest. Id. at 922-43.
D) Rehnquist, Thomas, Scalia, and White
1) Upheld all of the statute's provisions as rationally related to a
legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 944-79.
II. Abortion as a "liberty" interest under the Due Process Clauses:
A) O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Blackmun, and Stevens
1) Affirmed Roe, a pregnant woman's freedom of choice falls within
the meaning of "liberty." Id. at 912-14, 922-26, 2803-816.
B) Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Thomas
1) The right to abortion is not a constitutionally protected "liberty."
Id. at 979-1002.
87. Id. at 846.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 879 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
90. Id. at 846.
91. Id. at 873.
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woman's choice was "thoughtful and informed. '9 2 In an effort to
balance a woman's right to an abortion with the state's compelling
interests, the Joint Opinion revised the standard of review for re-
strictions on the abortion right, from a fundamental right subject to
strict scrutiny review under Roe,93 to a "liberty interest ' 94 subject
to an "undue burden" analysis under Casey.95
An abortion regulation is unconstitutional when it imposes an
"undue burden" on a woman's ability to obtain an abortion.96 A
burden is "undue" when the state regulation "has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seek-
ing an abortion of a nonviable fetus." 97 The Joint Opinion would
uphold state abortion regulations that were "calculated to inform
the woman's free choice, not hinder it."98 In determining whether
an abortion regulation imposed an undue burden on a woman's
right to choose, the focus should be on "the group [of women] for
whom the law is a restriction, not the group for whom the law is
irrelevant." 99 For example, when addressing the Pennsylvania stat-
ute's spousal notification provision, in a part joined by a majority
of the justices, the Joint Opinion dismissed the state's argument
92. Id. at 872.
93. Roe, 410 U.S. at 155.
94. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865, 875 n.25 (D. Utah 1992) ("In Casey the
Court [sic] revised the woman's right to abortion from a virtually unassailable funda-
mental right subject to strict scrutiny review to a liberty interest subject to undue
burden analysis."), affd and rev'd on other grounds, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
95. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874. Only the three justices who signed the Joint Opinion-
Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Kennedy-adopted the "undue burden" test. Id. at
869. Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Thomas, White, and Scalia, would have
adopted a lower standard of review than the undue burden test, in which abortion
regulations must rationally relate to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 944. Justices
Stevens and Blackmun would have preserved the abortion right as a fundamental
right subject to strict scrutiny review (an abortion regulation must be necessary for a
compelling state interest). Id. at 911, 922. In any event, in Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S.
Ct. 2597 (2000), the Court adopted the undue burden standard as the official standard
of review when addressing pre-viability abortion regulations. Infra Part I.B.4.
96. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
97. Id. at 877. The undue burden analysis of the Casey Joint Opinion applied to
pre-viability abortion regulations. Id. (explaining the standard of review as "whether a
law designed to further the State's interest in fetal life which imposes an undue bur-
den on the woman's decision before fetal viability could be constitutional"). Post-
viability abortion regulations remained subject to the same standard of review as
under Roe, which recognized the state's stronger interest in protecting fetal life:
"[S]ubsequent to viability, the State in promoting its interest in the potentiality of
human life may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother." Id. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
98. Id. at 877.
99. Id. at 894.
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that the provision was constitutional because "it imposes almost no
burden at all for the vast majority of women seeking abortions." 100
Although the vast majority of married women voluntarily notify
their husbands of their intentions to obtain abortions, in the "large
fraction of the cases in which [the spousal notification provision] is
relevant" '' (that is, for the group of women who would be at risk
of spousal abuse if the provision were upheld),'0 2 it will impose a
substantial obstacle on a woman's choice to have an abortion, re-
gardless of how small that relevant group of women may be."0 3
However, not every burden is necessarily "undue."'0 4 Although
a state abortion regulation may have the effect of burdening a par-
ticular group of women, it is "not of necessity a substantial obsta-
100. Id.
101. Id. at 895 (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 894-95. The statistics relied upon by the Casey Joint Opinion in striking
down the statute's spousal notification provision were as follows: only about twenty
percent of women who had abortions were married; of those twenty percent, approxi-
mately ninety-five percent voluntarily notified their husbands of their intentions to
obtain an abortion. Id. at 894. The provision, therefore, affected only one percent of
women who obtained abortions. Id. Nonetheless, the provision was struck down be-
cause it would have adversely affected (e.g., by risking spousal abuse, sexual assault,
and rape) a "large fraction" of that one percent of women. Id. at 894-95.
103. Id. The challenge to the Pennsylvania statute in Casey was a facial challenge.
Id. at 894. A facial challenge to a statute is the most difficult challenge to win. United
States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). A facial challenge generally requires a
complaining party to show that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute
would be valid. Id. However, the Casey Joint Opinion (without explicitly indicating it
was doing so) applied a different standard to the facial challenge of the spousal notifi-
cation provision of the Pennsylvania statute, referred to as the "large fraction" test: as
long as there were some circumstances under which the provision could be applied
unconstitutionally (e.g., the one percent of women who would suffer harm if com-
pelled by the provision to inform their husbands of their intent to have an abortion),
the provision would not (and did not) survive a facial challenge. Casey, 505 U.S. at
894-95. The fact that the spousal notification provision would have been applied con-
stitutionally in the vast majority of cases (the ninety-nine percent of women who did
not fear telling their husbands of their intent to have an abortion) was irrelevant to
the Joint Opinion. Id. The debate over whether Casey officially replaced the Salerno
facial challenge test with the "large fraction" test when analyzing abortion regulations
is beyond the scope of this Note. For more in depth analyses on this debate, see, e.g.,
Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 63 F.3d 1452, 1458 (8th Cir. 1995) ("We believe the
[Casey] Court [sic] effectively overruled Salerno for facial challenges to abortion stat-
utes."); Richmond Med. Ctr. For Women v. Gilmore, 11 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va.
1998) (holding that the Salerno decision no longer applies in the context of facial
challenges to abortion regulations on the ground that it imposes an undue burden on
the right to abortion). In any event, the Carhart Court applied Casey's "large frac-
tion" test (without explicitly indicating it was doing so). See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120
S. Ct. 2597, 2611 (2000) ("D&X is an infrequently used abortion procedure; but the
health exception question is whether protecting women's health requires an exception
for those infrequent occasions."); see also infra Part I.B.4.
104. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
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cle. '' 10 5 For instance, state regulations that do nothing more than
create "structural mechanism[s]" through which the state may ex-
press its compelling interests are not undue burdens under
Casey.
10 6
The Casey Joint Opinion also dismantled the trimester frame-
work established in Roe, stating: "We reject the trimester frame-
work, which we do not consider to be part of the essential holding
of Roe. 1 °7 The Joint Opinion found that the state may "promote
[its] profound interest in potential life" by taking measures
"throughout pregnancy ... to insure that the woman's choice is
informed.' 0 8 However, in a part joined by a majority of the jus-
tices, the Joint Opinion reaffirmed what it termed Roe's "central
holding," that the state cannot prohibit a woman from obtaining an
abortion before viability.109 Therefore, although the Casey Joint
Opinion rejected Roe's trimester framework, it reaffirmed Roe's
holding that the compelling "line should be drawn at viability," and
that prior to viability, a woman has the right to decide to terminate
her pregnancy. 110 Moreover, the Joint Opinion reaffirmed Roe's
holding that even subsequent to viability, a state may proscribe
abortion only if it will not impose a risk on the woman's life or
health."1
Five provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of
1982 were challenged as unconstitutional in Casey: an informed
consent requirement;112 a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting pe-
riod between the time of the informed consent and the abortion,
with a medical emergency exception;113 a parental consent provi-
sion for a minor's abortion, subject to a judicial bypass option;"' a
spousal notification provision with a medical emergency provi-
sion; 1 5 and certain reporting and record-keeping requirements for
abortion facilities.116 The Joint Opinion upheld all of these provi-
105. Id.
106. Id. at 877. For example, the Joint Opinion identified the parental notification
provision (with a judicial by-pass option) of the Pennsylvania statute as a "structural
mechanism." Id. at 877, 899. The Joint Opinion went on to uphold the provision. Id. at
899.
107. Id. at 873.
108. Id. at 878.
109. Id. at 879.
110. Id. at 870.
111. Id. at 879.
112. Id. at 881-85.
113. Id. at 879-80, 885-87.
114. Id. at 899-900.
115. Id. at 887-98.
116. Id. at 900-01.
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sions, except the spousal notification provision (and related report-
ing and record-keeping requirements), because they did not
impose an undue burden on women's access to abortion."17
In analyzing the Pennsylvania statute's provisions, the Joint
Opinion relied on the underlying premise that the state has a legiti-
mate interest in enacting legislation that "favor[s] childbirth over
abortion, even if those measures do not further [the interest of ma-
ternal health]" under Roe's trimester framework.' 18 For example,
assuming the statute's twenty-four hour waiting period was not re-
lated to maternal health, the provision was still constitutional, be-
cause it furthered the state's interest in protecting the life of the
unborn. 119 In addition, the Joint Opinion found that although the
waiting period would impose a burden on some women in the form
of increased delays, costs, and exposure to harassment, it would
"not create any appreciable health risk,"120 or any undue bur-
den."' The Joint Opinion also emphasized that an informed con-
sent provision was a reasonable way for the state to express its
legitimate interest in protecting the life of the unborn, which, as
opposed to under Roe, the state is able to do pre-, as well as, post-
viability.122 However, as under Roe, the state could not impose a
risk on the woman's life or health, even when exercising its post-
viability interest in potential life. 123
The Casey Joint Opinion did not explicitly modify the life and
health exception required by Roe.'24 In a holding by a majority of
the justices, the Joint Opinion upheld the statute's medical emer-
gency provision.125 The statute defined a medical emergency as
"[t]hat condition which, on the basis of the physician's good faith
clinical judgment... [is necessary] to avert her death or for which a
delay will create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impair-
ment of a major bodily function.' 1 26 The provision permitted phy-
sicians to forgo the waiting period, parental consent, and spousal
notification requirements of the Pennsylvania statute. 127 The Joint
117. Id. at 879.
118. Id. at 886.
119. Id. at 885.
120. Id. at 886.
121. Id. at 885.
122. Id. at 881-83.
123. Id. at 879.
124. Massie, supra note 4, at 341.
125. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
126. Id. at 879.
127. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 699 (3d Cir.
1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Opinion deferred to the Third Circuit's interpretation of the emer-
gency provision as broad enough to include the three serious, al-
though not necessarily "irreversible," physical conditions of
preeclampsia, inevitable abortion, and premature ruptured mem-
brane.1 28 The Third Circuit held that "[p]hysically threatening
emergencies are covered" by the emergency provision. 129 The
Joint Opinion also deferred to the Third Circuit's holding that the
emergency provision was not void for vagueness simply because it
contained a subjective standard of "good faith clinical
judgment. 130
3. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth:
Applying Roe to Regulations of Specific Abortion Techniques
Neither Roe nor Casey addressed whether a state may regulate
or ban a specific abortion technique as opposed to abortion in gen-
eral.1 31  The Supreme Court addressed the issue in Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.32 In Danforth, the
Court invalidated a Missouri prohibition of a particular method of
abortion known as "saline amniocentesis" because the Court held
that doing so would have banned the most common and safest sec-
ond trimester abortion procedure available at the time.133 The
method was performed after the first twelve weeks of pregnancy134
(the second trimester under Roe). The majority invalidated the
prohibition based on its findings that approximately seventy per-
cent of all abortions performed in the United Stated after the first
trimester used the prohibited procedure; 135 that there were no al-
ternative abortion procedures that were widely used 136 and that
were not "significantly more dangerous and critical for the wo-
man; '137 and that the maternal mortality rate in childbirth ex-
ceeded the mortality rate when saline amniocentesis was used. 138
The Court framed the issue as whether the ban on saline amni-
ocentesis was a restriction reasonably related to the protection of
128. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; infra Part II.B.l.a.i.
129. Casey, 947 F.2d at 702.
130. Id.; infra Part II.B.3.a.
131. Massie, supra note 4, at 342.
132. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
133. Id. at 78-79.
134. Id. at 75-76.
135. Id. at 76.
136. Id.
137. Id. Here, the Court was referring to the "hysterotomy" and "hysterectomy"
methods of abortion. Id. For a description of these procedures, see supra note 28.
138. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 76.
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maternal health as required by Roe.'39 The majority held that it
was not and that the ban impermissibly "forces a woman and her
physician to terminate her pregnancy by methods more dangerous
to her health than the method outlawed."14 Therefore, the major-
ity held that the ban did not serve the state's interest in maternal
health, the only permissible state interest at this stage of pregnancy
(the second trimester) under Roe.141 In fact, the ban was detrimen-
tal to women's health.1 42
4. Stenberg v. Carhart in Detail: The Supreme Court Requires a
Nebraska "Partial Birth" Abortion Ban to Contain an
Exception For the Health of the Pregnant Woman
Stenberg v. Carhart, decided in June of 2000, is the Supreme
Court's first decision addressing a statute banning partial birth
abortion.143 In Carhart, the Court struck down as unconstitutional
a ban on partial birth abortion. The Court did so primarily for two
reasons: (1) the statute lacked an exception for the health of the
woman, 144 and (2) the statute's language was unconstitutionally
vague and could be applied to ban both the D&X and D&E proce-
dures. 45 Therefore, the statute imposed an undue burden on a wo-
man's ability to choose a D&E abortion and, in turn, the right to
choose abortion itself. 146
139. Id.
140. Id. at 79.
141. Id. Danforth was decided in 1976 under Roe's trimester framework and strict
scrutiny standard of review. Although Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn-
sylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992), altered Roe to require that attention be
paid to the interests of the fetus throughout the entire pregnancy, Danforth remains
an important case in the partial birth abortion debate primarily for three reasons: (1)
the Danforth Court held that Roe may be applied when a particular method of abor-
tion (such as the D&X procedure) is restricted; (2) in Danforth, "saline amni-
ocentesis" was the most commonly used abortion method during the second trimester
(just as D&E is the most commonly used late-term abortion method during the sec-
ond trimester, while D&X is one of the least common methods used); and (3) there
was no safe alternative abortion method available to the saline amniocentesis method.
For a discussion on these points, see infra Parts II, III.
142. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79.
143. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597 (2000). Prior to Carhart, the Supreme
Court had denied certiorari in Voinovich v. Women's Med. Profl Corp., 523 U.S. 1036
(1998), in which the Sixth Circuit had invalidated an Ohio statute banning post-viabil-
ity partial birth abortions. See Women's Med. Prof'1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187
(6th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the Sixth Circuit's decision, see infra Parts II, III.
144. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2609-613.
145. Id. at 261.6-617.
146. Id. at 2609, 2613-617.
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The Carhart Court premised its decision to strike down the Ne-
braska statue on "three established principles" in abortion juris-
prudence: (1) "before 'viability ... the woman has a right to choose
to terminate her pregnancy' ,,;147 (2) a law in furtherance of the
state's interest in fetal life that imposes an undue burden on the
woman's right to choose an abortion pre-viability is unconstitu-
tional;148 and (3) "subsequent to viability, the State, in promoting
its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if it chooses, regu-
late, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or
health of the mother.' '1 49
The Nebraska statute applied to both pre- and post-viability
abortions.150 Although the Court held that Casey clearly reaf-
firmed Roe's holding that post-viability abortion regulations re-
quire a health exception,15' the Carhart Court found that Casey
and Roe also required a pre-viability health exception.152 The Car-
hart majority explained that because the Casey Joint Opinion
found that the state's interest in regulating abortion pre-viability is
much weaker than its interest post-viability, and that Casey re-
quired a health exception post-viability, "it at a minimum requires
the same in respect to pre-viability .... ", 5 The Carhart Court also
held that although the statute regulated only a method of abortion,
"a risk to a woman's health is the same whether it ... arise[s] from
regulating a particular method of abortion, or from barring abor-
tion entirely.' 54 Relying on precedent, 155 the Court held that the
147. Id. at 2604 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 870 (1992)).
148. Id. Therefore, the Carhart Court adopted the undue burden test as the official
standard of review when analyzing pre-viability abortion regulations, obviating any
confusion over how to interpret the complex Casey decision. Supra note 95 and ac-
companying text.
149. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2604 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973)).
150. Id. at 2609.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.; see also id. at 2618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Because even a post-via-
bility proscription of abortion would be invalid absent a health exception, Nebraska's
ban on pre-viability partial birth abortions, under the circumstances presented here,
must include a health exception as well, since the State's interest in regulating abor-
tion before viability is 'considerably weaker' than after viability." (quoting the major-
ity opinion, Id. at 2609)).
154. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
155. See infra Part II.B for discussions on the following cases: Thornburgh v. Am.
Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), Planned Parenthood of
Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (see also supra Part I.B.3), and Doe v.
Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
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state cannot pass abortion regulations that "subject women's
health to significant risk[s]" or "force women to use riskier meth-
ods of abortion. ' 156 However, the majority only briefly addressed
the proper scope of a health exception, by holding that a health
exception cannot be limited "to situations where the pregnancy it-
self created the health risk.' '1 57
In holding that the Nebraska statute required a health exception,
the Court relied, in large part, on the fact that there was a "division
of opinion among some medical experts over whether D&X is gen-
erally safer,' 1 58 and whether a D&X ban without a health excep-
tion would create "a significant health risk" for women.159 The
majority conceded that there was, in fact, uncertainty in the medi-
cal community as to whether "D&X is a safer abortion method in
certain circumstances.' 160 The majority found, however, that this
uncertainty demonstrated possible health risks to women-not the
absence of risk.16' Relying on Casey's large fraction test, 62 the
Court held that because there is substantial medical authority in
support of the medical necessity of D&X for some women, a ban
on D&X would impose an undue burden on those women for
whom it was the safest procedure. 63 The Court held in this
respect,
[T]he uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those who
believe that D&X is a safer abortion method in certain circum-
stances may turn out to be right. If so, then the absence of a
health exception will place women at an unnecessary risk of
tragic health consequences. If they are wrong, the exception
will simply turn out to have been unnecessary. 164
Again relying on Casey's large fraction test,165 the majority
found that it was "beside the point" that D&X is a rarely used
156. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2609.
157. Id. (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 2612.
159. Id. at 2613.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 2612.
162. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
163. See Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2610. Among the medical benefits associated with
D&X (and therefore the medical risks of D&E) cited by the Court were reductions in:
operating time, blood loss, risk of infection, complications from bony fragments, and
complications from retained fetal parts. Id. at 2610, 2612.
164. Id. at 2613.
165. Supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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procedure.166 Rather, the focus should be on "whether protecting
women's health requires an exception for those infrequent occa-
sions. ' ' 16 7 Therefore, while the Court conceded that there were no
medical studies documenting the safety of D&X compared to that
of D&E, it held that a health exception was necessary in a ban on
D&X because there was substantial medical opinion that D&X
"can be the most appropriate abortion procedure for some women
in some circumstances."'1 68
The Carhart Court also found that the word "necessary" in the
clause "necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preser-
vation of the life or health of the mother," did not mean "absolute
necessity" or "absolute proof.' 1 69 To the contrary, medical proce-
dures may be considered "appropriate" based on comparative
health risks and benefits.17 0 Moreover, universal medical agree-
ment on a procedure's comparative benefits and risks is not re-
quired. 171 The Court held that Casey's words, "appropriate
medical judgment," must be interpreted to "tolerate responsible
differences in medical opinion" because doctors often differ in
their determinations of what is appropriate treatment based on
comparative health risks. 172 A state, however, is not required to
grant physicians "unfettered discretion" in their choice of abortion
methods.17 3 The majority held:
[Wihere substantial medical authority supports the proposition
that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger
women's health, Casey requires the statute to include a health
exception when the procedure is "necessary, in appropriate
medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of
the mother.' 74
166. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2611. The Carhart Court also held that it was insignifi-
cant that only a "handful of doctors" used D&X. Id. The Court elaborated that the
fact that few doctors use a medical procedure does not imply that the procedure is not
necessary for some patients' health. Id. Rather, a number of reasons could explain
why the D&X procedure rarely is used, such as the rarity of late term abortions,
D&X's recent development, or the controversy surrounding it. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 2612.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. ld.
173. Id. at 2613.
174. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
879 (1992)).
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II. THE CONFLICT: WHETHER COURTS WILL REQUIRE
"PARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION BANS TO CONTAIN HEALTH
EXCEPTIONS, AND WHAT COURTS WILL REQUIRE THOSE
HEALTH EXCEPTIONS TO CONTAIN
A. After Carhart, Will Courts Require "Partial Birth"
Abortion Bans to Contain Exceptions for the Health of the
Pregnant Woman?
The Carhart majority arguably did not hold that partial birth
abortion bans always must contain a health exception. On the sur-
face, the Carhart decision seems to suggest that any ban on partial
birth abortion will require a health exception.175 A careful reading
of the decision, its concurring opinions, and the case law presented
in Part I, however, suggests that an answer to this threshold inquiry
may depend on the particular circumstances under which a consti-
tutional challenge to a partial birth abortion ban arises.
Undoubtedly, one of the two constitutional defects the Carhart
Court found in the Nebraska partial birth abortion ban was that it
did not have an exception for the health of the woman. 176 The Car-
hart majority held that, generally, precedent demanded a heath ex-
ception: Roe and Casey required an exception, "where it is
necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of
the life or health of the mother.' 1 77 The state, in promoting its
compelling interests, may not endanger a woman's health. 178 How-
ever, in this respect, the Carhart Court suggested that in its past
decisions it had invalidated statutes that imposed significant health
risks, not any and all health risks.179 The Court focused its health
exception analysis around the fact that there are, currently, no safe
alternatives to the D&X procedure. 8 The Court opined, "Ne-
braska responds that the law does not require a health exception
unless there is a need for such an exception. And here there is no
such need, it says."'' The majority rebutted this contention by
finding that, under the particular circumstances, there was a need
for D&X, because there was substantial medical evidence support-
ing "the proposition that in some circumstances, D&X would be
175. Supra Part I.B.4.
176. Supra Part I.B.4.
177. Roe v. Wade, 140 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
178. Supra Part I.B.4.
179. Supra Part I.B.4.
180. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2610 (2000).
181. Id.
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the safest procedure," despite the rarity of those circumstances.182
The majority then described several health risks of a ban on D&X
under those rare circumstances.183 The Court summed up its
health exception analysis with a narrow finding: "Given these medi-
cally related evidentiary circumstances, we believe the law requires
a health exception. 184
This textual analysis of Carhart suggests that, as long as there is
"substantial" medical evidence that D&X is the safest procedure
for some women in some circumstances, courts will require a
health exception. If, however, new evidence emerges that suggests
that D&X is not in fact safer than D&E for some women in some
circumstances, a court may find that a health exception is not "nec-
essary" for the health of the mother. In her concurrence in Car-
hart, Justice O'Connor articulated this thought when she
considered, "Nebraska's ban on previability partial birth abortions,
under the circumstances presented here, must include a health ex-
ception .... ,185 In fact, Justice O'Connor stated, even more point-
edly, "If there were adequate alternative measures for a woman
safely to obtain an abortion before viability, it is unlikely that
prohibiting the D&X procedure alone would 'amount in practical
terms to a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an
abortion.' "186
The Carhart majority, however, did not hold explicitly that a
health exception was required only because, or only in circum-
stances in which, there were no safe alternative abortion methods
to D&X.'8 7 Rather, the Court held only that under the circum-
stances presented to the Court, a health exception absolutely is re-
quired under Casey.1 88 It is revealing that Justice O'Connor's
pointed statements did not make it into the majority opinion.
182. Id. at 2611.
183. Id. at 2610, 2612.
184. Id. at 2612 (emphasis added).
185. Id. at 2618 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
186. Id. at 2620 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
187. See id. at 2609-13.
188. Id. at 2613 ("But where substantial medical authority supports the proposition
that banning a particular abortion procedure could endanger women's heath, Casey
requires the statute to include a health exception when the procedure is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother.").
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B. What Must a Health Exception Look Like for it to
Pass Constitutional Muster?
If future courts determine that statutes banning partial birth
abortion require a health exception, the controversy will shift to
the issue of how such courts should require legislatures to construct
health exceptions. More specifically, what features will courts re-
quire or forbid a health exception to contain, and how will future
courts interpret health exceptions? How difficult will it be for a
state or Congress to draft a health exception that will pass constitu-
tional muster? This Part presents competing sides of this contro-
versy by analyzing three issues that courts have tended to explore
most extensively. These issues are: (1) the meaning and scope of
the term "health" in a health exception; (2) the required severity of
the risk to the woman's health; and (3) whether there should be a
subjective or an objective standard for determining when a wo-
man's health is at risk.
1. The Meaning and Scope of the Term "Health"
Most courts have interpreted broadly the meaning and scope of
the term "health" in abortion statutes, 89 though these interpreta-
tions have varied in their particular degrees of broadness. Some
courts and individual judges, however, have taken more restrictive
views on the meaning and scope of "health."
a. The Broad Interpretation of "Health"
i. Review of Roe, Casey, and Carhart
As discussed in Part I, the Court in Roe interpreted broadly the
meaning and scope of the "health" of the woman. 9 ° In fact, the
Roe Court emphasized that avoiding the "[s]pecific and direct"
medical harm that a pregnancy may bring to a woman was a pri-
mary justification for the abortion right. 191 The examples of "spe-
cific and direct" medical harm provided by the Court included such
diverse areas as the "distressful life and future" additional off-
spring may impose on a woman, the "psychological harm" a wo-
man may experience as a result of pregnancy, and the "mental and
189. This Note sometimes will discuss health exception provisions interchangeably
with medical emergency provisions in abortion statutes. Although the two may serve
different purposes in abortion regulations, both are equally useful in analyzing how
courts will deal with the three controversial issues being explored in this Note, partic-
ularly the meaning and scope of the term "health."
190. Supra Part I.B.1.
191. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.113, 153 (1973).
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physical health" consequences that child care may impose on a wo-
man.192 The majority did not limit its interpretation of the health
of the woman to severe or permanent health problems, nor did it
limit it to health problems arising out of the pregnancy itself. 193
The Joint Opinion in Casey explicitly reaffirmed Roe's interpre-
tation of the meaning of the "health of the woman," that is, that
the state has a compelling interest, post-viability, in restricting
abortion, except when the life or health of the mother is at risk.'94
The Joint Opinion also articulated a broad interpretation of the
meaning of "health" by reaffirming the Third Circuit's interpreta-
tion of the Pennsylvania statute's medical emergency provision. 195
The statute defined a medical emergency as a "serious risk of sub-
stantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function. '196
The Third Circuit held that the provision was broad enough to en-
compass the "serious conditions" of preeclampsia, inevitable abor-
tion, and premature ruptured membrane. 97 The Third Circuit
found that the term "risk" in the provision "implie[d] an event that
may or may not happen in the future." 19 Therefore, although the
three conditions were not, by definition, "substantial and irreversi-
ble" health risks, they qualified under the medical emergency pro-
vision because "it is undisputed that under some circumstances
each of these conditions could lead to an illness with substantial
and irreversible consequences. "'19 In a Part joined by a majority of
the justices, the Joint Opinion found that such an interpretation
was required because "abortion regulations [c]ould not in any way
pose a significant threat to the life or health of the woman. "200
However, the Joint Opinion deferred to the Third Circuit's finding
that the medical emergency provision was limited to covering phys-
ical health risks only.201
The Carhart majority made few substantial findings on the
proper scope of a health exception.20 2 The Court held that a health
192. Id.
193. Id. at 153, 164-65.
194. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
This finding was joined by a majority of the justices. Id. at 846.
195. Id. at 879-80.
196. Id. at 879.
197. Id. at 880.
198. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833
(1992).
199. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
200. Id. (quoting Casey, 947 F.2d at 701).
201. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; infra Part II.B.l.b.
202. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2609-613 (2000).
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
exception cannot be limited to health risks arising out of the preg-
nancy itself.20 3 The scope of this finding, however, is unclear as to
questions such as whether the Court meant that a health exception
should encompass both physical and mental health risks, and
whether it should encompass both temporary and permanent
risks.2 °4 When discussing the health risks associated with the D&E
procedure, the majority focused exclusively on physical health
risks.20 5 The majority did not hold, however, that physical health
risks were the only kinds of health risks that would be considered
under a health exception to a partial birth abortion ban. 0 6
The Carhart Court also held that a health exception need not be
limited to health risks that are strictly "necessary" to protect the
woman's health.20 7 Rather, the Court found that an abortion pro-
cedure may be sufficiently "necessary" for the health of the woman
"in light of estimated comparative health risks in particular
cases. '"208 Therefore, if D&X is shown to be "safer" than D&E for
a woman's health in some cases, D&X is constitutionally "neces-
sary" for the woman's health.20 9 D&X need be only comparatively
more necessary than D&E and any other late-term abortion proce-
dures that may exist.210
ii. Other Broad Interpretations of the
Meaning and Scope of "Health"
Many other courts have interpreted broadly the meaning and
scope of the term "health" in abortion statutes. In United States v.
Vuitch, decided before Roe, the Court interpreted the meaning of
"health" broadly to include "mental health," as well as "psycholog-
ical" and "physical well-being. ' 2 1' The majority opined that a
health exception should not be required to specify explicitly mental
or psychological health in its language to avoid a vagueness chal-
203. Id. at 2609.
204. See generally id. at 2611-17.
205. Id. at 2610-12.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 2612.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971). Commentators have noted that
Vuitch is a particularly important decision because it was decided two years prior to
Roe, before the abortion debate became highly politicized on a national level. E.g.,
David J. Garrow, A LOOK AT ... The New Politics of Abortion: When "Compro-
mise" Means Caving In, WASH. POST, June 1, 1997, at C03 (discussing the controversy
surrounding Senator Daschle's proposed bill banning post-viability abortions).
1118
2001] "PARTIAL BIRTH" ABORTION AND HEALTH 1119
lenge.212 Rather, the "general usage and modern understanding"
of the word health was broad enough to encompass physical,
mental, and psychological health risks, all by implication.213
In Doe v. Bolton, the companion case to Roe, the Court also
interpreted the meaning of "health" very broadly.214 The Bolton
Court found that a doctor may exercise his medical judgment in
light of factors related to health, which included the woman's
"physical, emotional, psychological, [and] familial [health], and
[her] age. ' 215 The majority opined, "This allows the attending phy-
sician the room he needs to make his best medical judgment. And
it is room that operates for the benefit, not the disadvantage, of the
pregnant woman." 216 In Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey
v. Verniero, in which the district court had invalidated a statute
banning partial birth abortion, the Third Circuit similarly provided
a very broad definition of "health":
A woman's health may be severely compromised by carrying
a pregnancy to term. Certain physical and mental health condi-
tions are aggravated by or progress during pregnancy. Physio-
logical stress on the body increases during pregnancy and may
exacerbate physical conditions such as certain neurological and
immunological diseases, liver or kidney disease, severe hyper-
tension, cardiac conditions, and diabetes. For example .. .[a]
woman who suffers from a severe eye disease, relating to a pre-
existing condition of diabetes, may, because her laser therapy is
inconsistent with pregnancy, incur blindness if required to carry
to term. Mental conditions, such as schizophrenia, may also
worsen as a result of a pregnancy ....217
212. Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72.
213. Id. The Court quoted the definition of "health" found in WEBSTER'S DiC ION-
ARY: "the 'state of being ... sound in body (or) mind."' Id. However, the Court
arguably suggested that the term "health" does not necessarily permit a doctor to take
all factors relevant to a woman's health into consideration in deciding whether to
conduct an abortion. Id. at 71. The majority opined: "[D]octors are encouraged by
society's expectations, by the strictures of malpractice law and by their own profes-
sional standards to give their patients such treatment as is necessary to preserve their
health." Id.
214. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973).
215. Id.; see also Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that a
health exception based on the broad definition of "health" in Bolton was required in a
state policy limiting state medical assistance to therapeutic abortions).
216. Bolton, 410 U.S. at 192.
217. Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478, 502
(D. N.J. 1998), affd on other grounds, Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v.
Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). Farmer did not address the health exception
portion of Verniero. Id.
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Many courts that have supported a broad interpretation of the
meaning of "health" have emphasized that health exceptions
should include mental, as well as physical, health risks. For exam-
ple, in many of the cases already discussed, the courts defined
"health" to include mental and psychological health: Roe ("psycho-
logical harm," "mental and physical health");218 Vuitch ("mental"
and "psychological" health);219 Bolton ("physical, emotional, psy-
chological, [and] familial" health);220 and Verniero ("mental
conditions") .221
In Women's Medical Professional Corp. v. Voinovich, the Sixth
Circuit invalidated an Ohio statute that banned the D&X proce-
dure, banned all post-viability abortions, and contained a viability-
testing requirement.222 The statute contained a health exception
for when a "physician determines ... that the abortion is necessary
to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function
of the pregnant woman. '223 The exception provided exemptions
for a non-exhaustive list of health risks, all of which the court
found to be unquestionably physical in nature.224 The court held
that "on its face," the statute "appears to be limited to physical
health risks. '225 Relying on Bolton226 and Vuitch,227 the Sixth Cir-
cuit held that a statute banning post-viability abortions must con-
tain a health exception that includes both physical and mental
health risks.221 The court concluded that a post-viability abortion
ban that did not account for mental health risks unconstitutionally
218. Supra Part I.B.I.
219. Supra Part II.B.l.a.ii.
220. Supra Part II.B.1.a.ii.
221. Supra Part II.B.l.a.ii.
222. Women's Med. Prof'] Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 190, 210 (1997). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari in Voinovich. See 523 U.S. 1036 (1998). For a discus-
sion of Justice Thomas's dissent from the denial of certiorari in Voinovich, see infra
Part II.B.1.b.
223. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 190. The health exception in Voinovich applied specifi-
cally to the statute's ban on post-viability abortions. Id.
224. Id. at 206. These examples were: pre-eclampsia, inevitable abortion, prema-
turely ruptured membrane, diabetes, and multiple sclerosis. Id.
225. Id.
226. Supra Part II.B.1.a.ii.
227. Supra Part II.B.L.a.ii.
228. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 208-09; see also Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 490 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("[I]t would also seem illogical for a state to seek to protect a woman's
physical health while at the same time casting aside all concerns regarding her mental
health."); A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 904 F. Supp.
1434, 1467 (S.D. Ind. 1995) ("[I]t is difficult to see how ... restrictive concepts [such
as 'substantial and irreversible impairment' and 'major bodily function'] can be recon-
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violated Roe and Casey's holding that in post-viability abortions,
the state cannot proscribe abortions when they are necessary to
preserve the woman's life or health.229
The Voinovich court distinguished its holding from Casey.230 The
medical emergency provision of the Pennsylvania statute in Casey
was "substantially identical" to the Ohio statute's health exception
in Voinovich, particularly in that both provisions provided non-ex-
haustive lists of physical health risks.23 a Specifically, the Casey
Joint Opinion had deferred to the Third Circuit's interpretation
that the medical emergency provision was limited to physical
health risks.232 The Voinovich court held, however, that there was
a fundamental difference between a statute such as the one in
Casey that merely created delays to women's access to abortion,
and a statute, such as the one in Voinovich, that completely banned
all post-viability abortions.233 The Sixth Circuit considered that a
medical emergency provision without a mental health exception
does not necessarily impose an undue burden in a statute imposing
merely delays on women's access to abortion (e.g., informed con-
ciled with the requirement in Casey, Roe and [Bolton] that a medical emergency ex-
ception apply where compliance would cause a 'threat to her health."').
229. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209. Former President William Jefferson Clinton also
believed that a ban on partial birth abortion should contain a mental health excep-
tion. See Nancy E. Roman & Paul Bedard, Senators Battle Over Bill On Partial-Birth
Abortion; Clinton Backs Daschle Amid Emotional Pleas, WASH. TIMES, May 15, 1997,
at A12 (discussing President Clinton's decision to support Senator Tom Daschle's ban
on post-viability abortions, which provided an exception for "grievous injury" to the
woman's physical health). President Clinton twice vetoed bills passed by Congress
prohibiting partial birth abortion, in part, because the bills did not contain health
exceptions. See Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al. However, President Clinton sup-
ported Senator Daschle's proposed ban on post-viability abortions, although the ban
contained a health exception limited to physical health risks. Supra Roman & Bedard,
at A12. President Clinton believed that the health exception's language-when a wo-
man's pregnancy "risks grievous injury to her physical health" because of "a severely
debilitating disease or impairment specifically caused by the pregnancy"-was suffi-
cient to cover "severe mental stress, [which] can sometimes manifest itself physically."
Id.; see also Garrow, supra note 211, at C03 (discussing the controversy surrounding
Senator Daschle's proposed bill banning post-viability abortions); Brian D. Wassom,
Comment, The Exception that Swallowed the Rule?: Women's Medical Professional
Corporation v. Voinovich and the Mental Health Exception To Post-Viability Abortion
Bans, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 799, 835 (1999) (concluding that post-viability health
exceptions should be limited to physical health risks to protect the state's compelling
interest in potential life).
230. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 207.
231. Id.; supra notes 128 (Casey) and 224 (Voinovich) and accompanying text.
232. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992)
(relying on Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701-02
(3d Cir. 1991)).
233. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 208.
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sent and reporting requirements).234 The same provision, however,
in an abortion statute banning all access to an abortion procedure,
necessarily imposes an undue burden under Casey.235
b. The Narrow Interpretation of "Health"
Some courts and individual judges have called for a more narrow
interpretation of the meaning and scope of the term "health" in
abortion statutes. These courts and judges generally have held that
a health exception should be limited to physical health risks, and
should not include mental, psychological, emotional, or other kinds
of risks. In short, they have opined that a broad interpretation of
"health" will "swallow the rule. '236
The Casey Joint Opinion found that the Pennsylvania statute's
medical emergency exception should have been interpreted
broadly enough not only to include "substantial and irreversible"
health risks, but also to include health risks that could lead to ill-
nesses with "substantial and irreversible consequences. '237  The
Casey Joint Opinion, however, deferred to the lower court's finding
that the exception was limited to physical health risks.238 The
Third Circuit held only that, "The essence of the [medical emer-
gency] definition ... is that it allows a woman and her doctors to
forego many of the Act's requirements when there is a medical
emergency to the woman's physical health .... "239
234. Id.
235. Id. In his dissenting opinion in Voinovich, Judge Boggs also argued that mental
health risks should be included in an abortion statute's medical emergency provision.
Id. at 216-17 (Boggs, J., dissenting). However, Judge Boggs used a different analysis
than the majority. Id. Judge Boggs argued that in the language of the statute's medical
emergency exception, "impairment of a major bodily function," already included "suf-
ficiently severe 'mental and emotional harm"' risks, even though it did not specifically
list mental health risks. Id. at 217. Although the provision listed only physical health
conditions, it specifically provided that the list was "not limited to" those specific
conditions. Id. Judge Boggs opined: "It is counterintuitive to say that sufficiently se-
vere mental harm is not an impairment of a major bodily function; if anything, it could
be seen as an impairment of the most significant bodily function." Id. (emphasis in
original).
236. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104,112
(Sup. Ct. Ind. 1996) (Sullivan, J., dissenting); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 222
(1973) (White, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for embracing a broad definition
of health that "apparently values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than
the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she
carries").
237. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; infra Part II.B.l.a.i.
238. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
239. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 701 (3d Cir.
1991) (emphasis added).
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Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari in Voinovich, Justice Thomas argued that Supreme
Court precedent did not in any way suggest that a post-viability
abortion regulation required a mental health exception.240 He con-
tended that the vast majority of state statutes addressing abortion
have not contained mental health exceptions.2 41 He further argued
that decisions such as Vuitch and Bolton, which permitted physi-
cians to consider mental health risks, 42 did not require health ex-
ceptions to include mental health risks.243 Rather, these courts
provided, at best, that abortion regulations could contain mental
health exceptions and still be constitutional.244 Justice Thomas was
concerned that a broad interpretation of "health," especially in a
post-viability abortion regulation as in Voinovich, was contrary to
the principle, reaffirmed in Casey, that a state's interest in restrict-
ing abortion is "strongest after viability. '245 Finally, he argued that
because the vast majority of partial birth abortion statutes on the
books at the time the Court denied certiorari in Voinovich had "not
specified whether such abortions must be permitted on mental
health grounds," requiring statutes to do so would "cast unneces-
sary doubt" on the meaning of partial birth abortion bans.246
In any event, decisions such as Vuitch, Bolton, and Voinovich,247
"approved of taking a broad range of considerations into account
240. Voinovich v. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp., 523 U.S. 1036, 1037 (1998) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
241. Id.
242. Supra Part II.B.l.a.ii.
243. Voinovich, 523 U.S. at 1039-040 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
244. Id.; Wassom, supra note 229, at 812-14 (arguing that there is no "constitutional
necessity" of a mental health exception). It has been argued that these Courts decided
the cases on vagueness grounds, and only in dicta suggested that broad definitions of
health were permissible in abortion statutes. Wassom, supra note 229, at 813-19. For
example, in Vuitch, the majority did not require that health exceptions incorporate
mental heath risks. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971); Wassom, supra
note 229, at 812-14. Instead, the majority held only that the meaning of "health" in
the abortion statute was not void for vagueness, and that doctors could consider a
"broad range of factors" when determining if a woman's health was at risk. Vuitch,
402 U.S. at 62; Wassom, supra note 229, at 812-14. Similarly, in Bolton, the Court's
"ultimate holding" was that the statute's health exception was not void for vagueness.
Wassom, supra note 229, 814-17. Only in dicta did the Bolton majority opine that
physicians could include any number of factors, including mental health risks, in the
definition of "health." Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973); Wassom, supra note
229, at 814-17. In sum, these decisions "approved of the state's interest in considering
all facets of "health," not its requirement to do so." Wassom, supra note 229, at 817
(emphasis in original).
245. Voinovich, 523 U.S. at 1037 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 1040.
247. Supra Part II.B.l.a.ii.
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when assessing the impact of an unwanted pregnancy on a woman's
health. "248
2. Must a Woman's Health be Severely at Risk?
Neither Roe nor Casey explicitly addressed how severe or seri-
ous a health risk must be to qualify under a health exception in an
abortion statute, or, for that matter, whether a severity require-
ment is required in a health exception at all.24 9 Several courts
have, however, analyzed the language of health exceptions in abor-
tion statutes, particularly "choice of method statutes, '250 to deter-
mine how severe a risk must be to a woman's health to qualify
under a health exception.
a. The Impermissible "Trade-Off"
Some courts have held that requiring a health risk to meet a par-
ticular level of severity is unconstitutional because it results in a
statute that no longer focuses on maternal health as its "paramount
concern." 251 For example, in Thornburgh v. American College of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 252 the Court invalidated a choice
of method statute because the statute's health exception was un-
constitutional. 253 The health exception provided that a doctor was
exempt from the choice of method requirement if, "in [his] good-
faith medical judgment [the abortion] technique 'would present a
significantly greater medical risk to the life or health of the preg-
nant woman.' ",254 The majority affirmed the lower court's finding
that the statute's health exception required an unconstitutional
"trade-off between the woman's health and fetal survival, and
failed to require that maternal health be the physician's paramount
consideration. '" 255 The majority opined that the language, "signifi-
248. Wassom, supra note 229, at 817.
249. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
250. A "choice of method" statute is a statute that requires the doctor to use the
abortion technique "which would provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to
be aborted alive." Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476
U.S. 747, 468 (1986).
251. Massie, supra note 4, at 357.
252. Casey departed from the holding of Thornburgh with regard to invalidating
certain informed consent requirements. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87. However, the
"trade-off" analysis in Thornburgh was not addressed in Casey.
253. Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 768-69. In Thornburgh, the choice of method statute
applied to post-viability abortions only. Id. at 768.
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 768-69.
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cantly greater medical risk," unconstitutionally required the
"mother to bear an increased medical risk in order to save her via-
ble fetus. 256
In Jane L. v. Bangerter, the Tenth Circuit, relying on Roe, Casey,
and Thornburgh, invalidated a choice of method statute that ex-
cepted only cases where the abortion method would "gravely dam-
age a woman's medical health. ' 257 In Bangerter, the court held that
requiring the woman's health to be in "grave" danger before she
could take advantage of the statute's health exception imposed an
unconstitutional "health burden" on the woman. 8 The court ex-
plained that such a health burden was contrary to the "unifying
thread" of Roe and Casey: that maternal health is the physician's
paramount concern.259 The Tenth Circuit found the statute uncon-
stitutional because:
Under the statute ... [the woman] may have to endure addi-
tional health damage and suffering if the method most likely to
save her unborn child's life.., would itself inflict damage, albeit
not "grave" damage, on her health .... [This] clearly demand[s]
that a woman bear an "increased medical risk" in order to save
the life of a viable fetus. 260
Courts also have used the "trade-off" rationale to strike down
health exceptions in partial birth abortion bans. For example, in
Planned Parenthood of Central New Jersey v. Verniero,261 the dis-
trict court held that a partial birth abortion ban that completely
lacked a health exception created an unconstitutional "trade-off"
under Thornburgh, resulting in "a woman [being] forced to make
an untenable choice between either undergoing a risky abortion
256. Id. at 769; see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400-01 (1979) (holding
that a choice of method statute was void for vagueness because it was ambiguous
whether the statute's health exception applied an objective or a subjective standard to
determine when a woman's health was at risk).
257. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493, 1502-505 (10th Cir. 1995), rev'd sub nom.
on other grounds, Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137 (1996) (emphasis added).
258. Id. at 1503.
259. Id. at 1504.
260. Id. at 1505.
261. Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d 478 (D.
N.J. 1998), affd on other gounds, Planned Parenthood of Cent. New Jersey v. Farmer,
220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). Farmer did not address the health exception portion of
Verniero. See also Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. James, 984 F. Supp. 1404, 1460, 1463
(M.D. Ala. 1998) (denying motion to dismiss and holding that post-viability abortion
statute's strict health exception and whether it impermissibly required a "trade-off,"
was an issue for trial), affd and rev'd on other grounds, Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v.
Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999).
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procedure or continuing her pregnancy in the face of unknown
risks and health concerns. 262
b. The Permissible "Trade-Off"
Some courts and individual judges are of the opinion that abor-
tion statutes are not necessarily unconstitutional because they con-
tain health exceptions that require a more severe risk to the
woman's health. In fact, some courts have found that health excep-
tions must contain some sort of severity requirement to avoid the
exception "swallow[ing] up the rule.9263
In Casey, the Joint Opinion upheld the Pennsylvania statute's
medical emergency provision that was limited to "serious risks of
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily func-
tion. '264 As discussed above, the Joint Opinion deferred to the
Third Circuit's broad interpretation of the terms "serious" and
"risk. '265 However, the Third Circuit also found that while a wo-
man was not required to suffer an immediate health risk, her
health problem had to be one that could lead to a "a substantial
and irreversible impairment. '266  Moreover, other references
throughout the Third Circuit and Supreme Court opinions reveal a
clear intent to limit the medical emergency provision to serious and
permanent health risks. For instance, the Third Circuit continually
used language such as, "serious risk," "irreversible injury," and
"significant" risk.267 The Third Circuit considered, "the wording
seems to us carefully chosen to prevent negligible risks to life or
health or significant risks of only transient health problems from
262. Verniero, 41 F. Supp. 2d at 502 (quoting Hope v. Ryan, 995 F. Supp. 847, 860
(N.D. II. 1998)) (citations omitted).
263. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 671 N.E.2d 104, 112
(Sup. Ct. Ind. 1996) (Sullivan, J., dissenting). In Newman, Indiana's medical emer-
gency provision allowed abortions only when the delay in termination of the preg-
nancy would "create serious risk of substantial and irreversible impairment of a major
bodily function." Id. Judge Sullivan argued that an interpretation of this language also
to mean a "substantial but reversible" impairment," or "irreversible impairments of
minor bodily functions," risked "open[ing] [up the exception] to every abortion you
can think of .... ." Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also Doe v. Kenley,
584 F.2d 1362, 1366 (4th Cir. 1978) (holding that, while life exception in state policy
limiting reimbursement for abortions to those performed to save a woman's life
should be replaced by a health exception, the health exception was to be limited to
instances of "substantial endangerment of health").
264. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
265. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; supra Part II.B.l.a.i.
266. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880; Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947
F.2d 682, 700-01 (3d Cir. 1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
267. Casey, 947 F.2d at 700-01.
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serving as an excuse for noncompliance .... "268 The Supreme
Court concluded that the Third Circuit's interpretation of "serious"
risk did not impose an undue burden on a woman's abortion right
and was, therefore, constitutional.269
Similarly, in Voinovich, although the Sixth Circuit invalidated an
Ohio statute banning partial birth abortion on other grounds,27 ° the
opinion's language suggests that the court saw no constitutional
problem with a health exception that required a more severe
health risk.2 7' The statute provided for an exception when "the
abortion is necessary to prevent ... serious risk of the substantial
and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the preg-
nant woman." 272 The court held that the exception was unconstitu-
tional "because it does not allow ... abortions where necessary to
prevent a serious, non-temporary threat to a pregnant woman's
mental health. '273 This language suggests approval of a health ex-
ception requiring a serious and permanent health risk. 74 In fact, in
an effort to temper its holding that health exceptions to partial
birth abortion bans require a mental health exception, the Sixth
Circuit emphasized that a health exception can encompass only
"severe irreversible risks of mental and emotional harm. ' 275
In his dissenting opinion in Thornburgh, Justice White similarly
approved of the health exception in the Pennsylvania statute that
required that a woman be exposed to a "significantly greater medi-
cal risk" before she could take advantage of the exception.276 He
concluded that the word "significantly" could be interpreted to
mean merely a "meaningful," "cognizable," "appreciable," or
"non-negligible" health risk.277 Justice White argued that rather
than requiring a "trade-off" between the mother's health and fetal
survival, the health exception required only that the "risk be a real
and identifiable one. '278 He contended that a requirement that a
268. Id. at 701.
269. Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
270. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187, 209 (6th Cir. 1997).
The Sixth Circuit invalidated the statute, in large part, because its health exception
was limited to physical health risks. Supra Part II.B.1.a.ii.
271. See Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 209.
272. Id.
273. Id. (emphasis added).
274. Id.
275. Id. (emphasis added).
276. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 807
(1986) (White, J., dissenting).
277. Id.
278. Id.
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risk to a woman's health be "significantly greater" was a proper
expression of the state's interest in potential fetal life, and a guar-
anty that the state's interest would not be "subordinated to a pur-
ported maternal health risk that is in fact wholly insubstantial. '279
c. Stenberg v. Carhart: The Middle-of-the-Road
Approach to the "Trade-Off"
In Carhart, the Court took a middle-of-the-road approach on the
issue of how severe a heath risk should be to qualify under a health
exception in a partial birth abortion ban. The majority opinion
suggests that while a health risk need not be strictly "necessary" for
the preservation of a woman's health, it should, nonetheless, be a
serious health risk.28 0 For example, although the majority invali-
dated the Nebraska statute, in part, because it did not contain a
health exception at all,281 the majority qualified its holding by find-
ing that a "State cannot subject women's health to significant
risks. '282 Although the Court did not elaborate extensively on this
statement, it provided examples of what it meant by "significant
risk," e.g., that a "significant" health risk means something more
than just situations in which the pregnancy itself creates the health
threat.283
The majority also forbade states from forcing women to "use
riskier methods of abortion. ' 284 Although the majority did not de-
fine what it meant by "riskier" when describing the health benefits
of the D&X procedure (i.e., how D&X may be "less risky" than
D&E for "some women in some circumstances"), the majority
listed health benefits such as: "reduces complications from bony
fragments," "reduces operating time, blood loss and risk of infec-
tion," "prevents the most common causes of maternal mortality
(e.g., retained fetal tissue)," and "involves less risk of uterine per-
foration or cervical laceration. ' 285 While these "health risks" are
279. Id. Although former President William Jefferson Clinton vetoed two bills by
Congress banning partial birth abortion, in part, because they did not contain health
exceptions, he appeared to support a health exception that applied only to severe
risks to a woman's health. See Wassom, supra note 229, at 835 n.289. President Clin-
ton stated, "I support a [health] exception ... making crystal clear that the procedure
may be used only in cases where a woman risks death or serious damage to her health,
and in no other case." Id.
280. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2604-605, 2609, 2610, 2612 (2000).
281. Id. at 2604-605.
282. Id. at 2609 (emphasis added).
283. Id.
284. Id. (emphasis added).
285. Id. at 2610, 2612.
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not all permanent in nature (not "irreversible"), they are surely
serious. Moreover, after listing the benefits of D&X, the majority
agreed with the district court's finding that "D&X significantly ob-
viates health risks in certain circumstances .... 286
When analyzing the clause, "necessary, in appropriate medical
judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the
mother, 12 87 however, the Carhart majority held that a "health risk"
was not required to be so severe that an abortion must be "abso-
lutely necessary" for the preservation of the mother's health.
288
Rather, the Court held that a medical procedure may be constitu-
tionally "necessary" when viewed in light of "comparative" health
risks and benefits in a particular case. 89
3. "In Appropriate Medical Judgment": A Subjective or
Objective Standard for Determining When
a Woman's Health is at Risk?
Roe provided, and Casey affirmed, that the state may regulate,
and even proscribe, abortion after viability, "except where ... nec-
essary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the
life or health of the mother. '29° Different courts have interpreted
the phrase, "in the appropriate medical judgment of the attending
physician," either from an objective or subjective perspective.
Most courts have adopted a subjective, "good faith," interpretation
of the clause. A significant minority of courts and justices, how-
ever, have interpreted the clause from an objective perspective,
usually on the ground that a subjective approach risks encouraging
"abortion on demand. '291
a. The Subjective Interpretation
When first articulating the "appropriate medical judgment" stan-
dard, the Roe Court did not address explicitly whether it intended
the phrase to be interpreted objectively, subjectively, or some-
where in between.292 Throughout Roe, however, the majority con-
286. Id. at 2612 (emphasis added).
287. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
288. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (2000).
289. Id.
290. Roe, 410 U.S. at 165 (emphasis added) (quoted in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992)).
291. E.g., Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2652 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that a broad
and subjectively-based health exception "eviscerates Casey's undue burden standard
and imposes unfettered abortion-on-demand").
292. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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sistently stressed the central role of the physician in the abortion
decision, both in counseling the woman about whether to have the
abortion, 93 and in determining how the abortion was to be carried
out.
294
Moreover, the Roe decision contains language that strongly sug-
gests approval of a case-by-case, doctor-by-doctor, determination
of whether an abortion is necessary.295 For example, the Court
held that during the first trimester,296 "the attending physician, in
consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without regula-
tion by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient's preg-
nancy should be terminated. '297 The Court noted further that its
decision "vindicates the right of the physician to administer medi-
cal treatment. . ." and, that the "basic responsibility for [the abor-
tion decision] must rest with the physician. "298
Roe's language also suggests, however, that this case-by-case de-
termination should be balanced by objective medical standards.299
For example, the majority opined that physicians' broad discretion
was to be checked against an objective medical standard.3 °° In this
respect, the majority found that if "the individual practitioner"
abused his privilege of exercising proper medical judgment," legal
and "intra-professional" remedies would apply.3 °1
In Vuitch, the Court also supported granting physicians broad
discretion to determine when an abortion was necessary to protect
a woman's life or health.302  The Court opined that, "whether a
particular operation is necessary for a patient's.., health is a judg-
293. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 ("All these factors the woman and her responsible physi-
cian necessarily will consider in consultation.").
294. Id. at 164 ("For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the
pregnant woman's attending physician.").
295. Id. at 163.
296. The Roe Court found that up to the two "compelling points" in a pregnancy,
the points at which the state's interests in maternal heath and fetal survival become
compelling, "the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and primarily, a
medical decision." Id. at 166. This does not mean, however, that after these two points
the abortion decision is no longer primarily a medical one and the state may come in
and regulate at its will. Id. at 163. Rather, even at these compelling points, the state's
regulatory power is limited: Under both Roe and Casey, the state may not regulate
abortion where such regulation would threaten a woman's life or health. Supra Parts
I.B.1, 2.
297. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (emphasis added).
298. Id. at 165-66.
299. Id. at 163.
300. Id. at 165-66.
301. Id. at 166.
302. See United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 71 (1971).
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ment that physicians are obviously called upon to make routinely
whenever surgery is considered. 30 3 In fact, the majority went so
far as to suggest that the burden of proving that a physician has not
acted within a statute's health exception should be on the prosecu-
tion.3"4 The majority concluded: "We are unable to believe that
Congress intended that a physician be required to prove his
innocence. 30 5
In Bolton, the Court adopted a subjective approach to determine
the proper scope of a doctor's discretion in deciding when an abor-
tion is "necessary" for the woman's health.30 6 The abortion statute
in Bolton provided that an abortion was "non-criminal" when
"based upon [the physician's] best clinical judgment . . . that an
abortion is necessary . "..."307 The Court rejected the argument
that because the "best clinical judgment" language would be "sub-
ject to diverse interpretation," doctors would act arbitrarily with-
out an objective standard to guide them.30 s Instead, consistent with
Vuitch, the Bolton majority pointed out that it was the norm in the
medical field for doctors to be called upon to decide whether a
procedure was "necessary" for a patient's health.30 9 There was no
valid reason why deciding whether an abortion was necessary for a
woman's health should be any different.310
In Casey, the Pennsylvania statute provided that an exception
existed under the medical emergency provision "on the basis of the
physician's good faith clinical judgment. ' 311 The Casey Joint Opin-
ion affirmed the Third Circuit's finding that the subjective standard
in the statute was not void for vagueness, because: "We fail to see
how any physician practicing in good faith could fear conviction
under the Act. '312 Determining whether an emergency is present
303. Id. at 72.
304. Id. at 69-71.
305. Id. at 71.
306. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183, 191-92 (1973).
307. Id. at 183 (emphasis added).
308. Id. at 191.
309. Id. at 192.
310. Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
The Danforth Court stressed similar themes as the Bolton Court. Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 64. In passing judgment on a Missouri statute that defined viability, the Danforth
majority elaborated that viability is "a matter of medical judgment, skill, and technical
ability, and we preserved [in Roe] the flexibility of the term .... [T]he determination
of whether a particular fetus is viable is, and must be, a matter for the judgment of the
responsible attending physician." Id.
311. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
312. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 702 (3d Cir.
1991), affd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Casey, 505 U.S. at 880.
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under the statute is, moreover, the "type of judgment[ ] that physi-
cians are obviously called upon to make routinely whenever sur-
gery is considered. '313
In Voinovich, the Sixth Circuit found the partial birth abortion
ban's health exception, which had a mixed objective and subjective
standard to determine when a woman's health was a risk, void for
vagueness. 314 The health exception provided that the existence of a
health risk would be determined "by a physician, and that physi-
cian determines, in good faith and in the exercise of reasonable
medical judgment. ' 315 The court found that the health exception
was unconstitutionally vague316 because physicians would be liable
even if they acted in their own good faith medical judgment.317
Moreover, the court found that a requirement that a doctor's de-
termination be objectively reasonable to other physicians "would
chill the performance of ... abortions .... 318
b. The Objective Interpretation
A few courts and justices support the proposition that a physi-
cian's medical determination should be based on an objective stan-
dard of reasonableness in the medical community, because a
subjective standard would encourage "abortion on demand. '31 9
313. Casey, 947 F.2d at 702 (quoting Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 192 (1973)).
314. Voinovich, 130 F.3d at 203-04. As discussed in Part II.B.l.a.ii supra, one of the
Sixth Circuit's primary reasons for invalidating the statute was that its health excep-
tion was limited to physical health considerations.
315. Id. at 190 (emphasis added).
316. Id. at 203. More precisely, the Voinovich court found that the constitutional
defect of the statute's health exception was that it did not contain a scienter, or intent,
requirement. Id. Nonetheless, the court's conclusion that the statute required a scien-
ter requirement presupposed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague because it
imposed both an objective and a subjective reasonableness requirement. Id. The Sixth
Circuit found merely that a scienter requirement may have saved the already-uncon-
stitutional statute. Id.
317. Id. at 204.
318. Id. at 203. Two other cases have supported the proposition that a physician
should be required to show only that he exercised a subjective, good faith determina-
tion of reasonableness: Fargo Women's Health Org. v. Schafer, 18 F.3d 526, 534 (8th
Cir. 1994) (holding that a medical emergency clause to an informed consent require-
ment of an abortion statute was "saved" from vagueness by language that permitted
physicians to rely on their "good faith clinical judgment" in determining whether a
condition constituted a medical emergency); Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362, 1365 (4th
Cir. 1978) ("The Medical Assistance Program does not intend to second guess each
physician on his/her professional judgment . . ").
319. E.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2652 (2000) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(arguing that a broad and subjectively based health exception "eviscerates Casey's
undue burden standard and imposes unfettered abortion-on-demand").
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In Karlin v. Foust, the Seventh Circuit held that a medical emer-
gency provision in an informed consent statute was constitutional
even though it relied upon an objective standard for evaluating a
physician's decision to perform an emergency abortion.320 The
emergency provision at issue in Karlin required a physician to exer-
cise "reasonable medical judgment" when determining if a preg-
nant woman should be exempt from the statute's provisions.321
The court explicitly rejected the Voinovich court's finding that an
objective standard is necessarily unconstitutional. 322 The Karlin
court found, instead, that an objective standard would not chill a
physician's discretion to decide whether a procedure is necessary
for the preservation of maternal health.323 An objective standard
would give physicians fair warning that their actions are illegal.324
The majority based its finding on the fact that there always exists a
"number of reasonable medical options" from which a doctor
could choose.32 Finally, the court found that doctors are, in any
event, routinely called upon to "assess[ ] the seriousness of a risk to
a patient's health ... under an objective standard knowing that if
they make an objectively erroneous determination they may be
subject to civil liability. '326
Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Bolton, which Chief Justice
Rehnquist joined, Justice White argued that granting doctors broad
discretion to determine when an abortion is necessary to protect a
woman's health could create a situation in which, "for any... rea-
son[], or for no reason at all . . ." any woman is entitled to an
abortion at her request if she is able to find a medical advisor will-
ing to undertake the procedure. ' 327 Likewise, in his dissenting
opinion in Carhart, Justice Kennedy argued that the Carhart major-
ity, by invalidating the Nebraska statute because it lacked a health
exception, "awards each physician a veto power over the state's
judgment that the procedures should not be performed. ' 328 He
320. Karlin v. Foust, 188 F.3d 446, 463 (7th Cir. 1999).
321. Id. at 459.
322. Id. at 460-64.
323. Id. at 465.
324. Id. at 464-65.
325. Id. at 464.
326. Id. at 464-65.
327. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221 (1973) (White, J., dissenting).
328. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2627 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see
also id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that if a health exception in a partial
birth abortion ban permitted a physician, "in his expert medical judgment," to deter-
mine when an abortion was "necessary" for the woman's heath, the physician would
effectively "give live-birth abortion free rein").
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also contended that precedent did not support a standard in which
an abortion is deemed "necessary" whenever the individual physi-
cian believes it to be the "most appropriate course of treat-
ment."32 9 Rather, he argued that the Casey Joint Opinion found
that the state had an interest in protecting potential life; and grant-
ing doctors boundless discretion to decide when an abortion is nec-
essary would effectively nullify that state interest. 330 Finally, in his
dissenting opinion in Carhart, Justice Thomas summed up the cri-
tique of a subjectively based health exception as follows:
[S]uch a health exception requirement eviscerates Casey's un-
due burden standard and imposes unfettered abortion-on-de-
mand. The exception entirely swallows the rule. In effect, no
regulation of abortion procedures is permitted because there
will always be some support for a procedure and there will al-
ways be some doctors who conclude that the procedure is
preferable.33'
c. Stenberg v. Carhart: Uncertain Precedent on the Meaning of
"In Appropriate Medical Judgment"
Writing for the majority in Carhart, Justice Breyer only briefly
addressed the physician's proper role in determining when a wo-
329. Id. at 2627 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("Casey does not give precedence to the
views of a single physician or a group of physicians regarding the relative safety of a
particular procedure.").
330. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy stated, "A ban which depends
on the 'appropriate medical judgment' of Dr. Carhart is no ban at all .... This, of
course, is the vice of a health exception resting on the doctor's discretion .... Rather
than exalting the right of a physician to practice medicine with unfettered discretion,
Casey recognized: 'Whatever constitutional status the doctor-patient relation may
have as a general matter, in the present context it is derivative of the woman's posi-
tion."' Id. at 2629, 2631 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992)).
331. Id. at 2652 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). It also has been
argued that although some courts have supported a subjective standard in health ex-
ceptions, no court has required one. E.g., Wassom, supra note 229, at 819-20 ("[N]o
decision explicitly has found the subjectivity requirement to be a constitutional man-
date."). Rather, these courts generally have based their ultimate findings on vague-
ness analyses, finding it unclear whether the statutes imposed subjective or objective
standards. See id. at 819; see also Doe v. Bolton, 402 U.S. 62, 71-2 (1973) (arguing that
the abortion statute's health exception was not void for vagueness simply because
"health" could include psychological, as well as physical, factors); United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971) (holding that the meaning of "health" in the abortion
statute was not void for vagueness); Jane L. v. Bangerter, 809 F. Supp. 865 (D. Utah
1992) (finding abortion statute constitutional on the ground that the subjective lan-
guage in the statute's medical emergency provision was not void for vagueness), affd
and rev'd on other grounds, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
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man's health is at risk under a health exception.332 In so doing,
Justice Breyer, for the most part, responded to the arguments of
the dissenting justices, without providing a clear answer regarding
whether a physician should be subject to an objective or subjective
standard under a health exception in a partial birth abortion ban.333
For example, the majority noted, "By no means must a state grant
physicians 'unfettered discretion' in their selection of abortion
measures." 334 A state may, in fact, proscribe an abortion proce-
dure even when "a particular physician" deems it necessary for a
woman's health.335
However, "where substantial medical authority supports the pro-
position that banning a particular abortion procedure would en-
danger women's health, Casey requires the statute to include a
health exception when the [abortion] procedure is 'necessary...
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.' ,,336 The
Carhart Court did not address whether a health exception still
would be required if there was no longer a divide in medical opin-
ion about the health risks of the D&E procedure; or, if there was
no longer "substantial medical authority" supporting the proposi-
tion that banning D&X "could endanger a woman's health. 337
IM. THE FUTURE OF THE HEALTH EXCEPTION
A. After Carhart, Courts Likely Will Require Statutes Banning
"Partial Birth" Abortion Always to Contain an
Exception for the Health of the Woman
One thing is certain: if courts are faced with the same circum-
stances as in Carhart, they undoubtedly will require any statute
banning partial birth abortion to contain an exception for the
health of the woman. This prediction is drawn from several points
gleaned from the case law. First, the fact that partial birth abortion
is a pre-viability abortion procedure has sometimes been ignored or
overlooked in cases and commentary.338 The vast majority of the
court decisions in Parts I and II supra make clear that the Supreme
Court never, prior to the partial birth abortion controversy, came
332. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
333. See id.; see also supra Part II.B.3.b for a discussion of the dissenting opinions in
Carhart.
334. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
335. Id.
336. Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
879 (1992)) (quotations omitted).
337. Id.
338. See supra Parts I, II.
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close to holding that states have the authority to ban outright a
pre-viability abortion procedure.339 Such a holding would be con-
trary to even the most liberal reading of the seminal cases in abor-
tion jurisprudence. Roe and Casey, and all subsequent decisions,
have unequivocally required that post-viability abortion regulations
contain an exception for the health of the woman. 340 Even at the
point at which the state's interest in potential life is at its strong-
est-post-viability-the state still cannot proscribe abortion when
it is necessary to protect the woman's life or health.34'
It is, therefore, irrational to argue that, pre-viability, when the
state's interests are weaker than they are post-viability (even under
Casey),3 42 a state can proscribe an abortion procedure without in-
cluding a health exception. The Carhart majority recognized the
constitutional absurdity of such a situation, and laid the issue to
rest.343 The majority persuasively reasoned that because Roe and
Casey require that post-viability abortion proscriptions have health
exceptions, pre-viability abortion proscriptions also must have
health exceptions-because the state's interest in regulating abor-
tion is weaker pre-viability than it is post-viability.344
A constitutional mandate requiring a health exception in pre-
viability and post-viability abortion proscriptions can mean only
one thing-abortion regulations must be constructed in a way that
protects the health of the woman at all stages of pregnancy. The
requirement that pre-viability abortion proscriptions contain
health exceptions also is supported firmly by several other discrete
points throughout abortion case law. For instance, although Casey
fundamentally altered many of Roe's holdings,345 Casey did not ob-
viate the need for a health exception in pre-viability abortion regu-
lations.346 Although the Casey Joint Opinion stressed the
permissibility of state abortion regulations throughout preg-
nancy,347 it did not come close to suggesting that a state may ban a
pre-viability abortion procedure to further its compelling interests.
As the Voinovich court observed, Casey upheld only structural
measures of the Pennsylvania abortion statute that did not impose
339. Supra Parts I-I.
340. Supra Part I.B.1, 2.
341. Supra Part I.B.1, 2.
342. Supra Part I.B.1, 2.
343. Supra Part I.B.4.
344. Supra Part I.B.4.
345. Supra Part I.B.2.
346. See supra Part I.B.2.
347. Supra Part LB.2.
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absolute bans on a woman's access to abortion.348 Whatever incon-
venience or burden these measures may impose on a pregnant wo-
man, if she complies with the measures, she ultimately will be
permitted to exercise her constitutional right to obtain an abortion.
A ban on abortion without a health exception, however, does not
allow a woman ultimately to exercise her constitutional right to
abortion. In any event, the Pennsylvania statute in Casey at least
contained a medical emergency provision that excused compliance
with the statute's measures under certain circumstances. 349
Upholding pre-viability abortion proscriptions that do not in-
clude health exceptions would, moreover, contravene the control-
ling principle and spirit behind Roe and Casey. The decision to
grant constitutional protection to a woman's right to have an abor-
tion was built around the state's interest in the health and well-
being of the woman as the "paramount concern. '35 ° Although the
Roe Court recognized compelling state interests that qualified a
woman's right to abortion,351 the framework Roe established relied
on the state's interest in maternal health. Under Roe, the state
could begin regulating abortion only when it became necessary to
protect an increased risk to the woman's health.3 5 2 Although the
Casey Joint Opinion dismantled the trimester framework, it still
structured the abortion right around the state interests recognized
in Roe.353 Having reaffirmed Roe's requirement of a post-viability
health exception, a state cannot under Casey exercise its interest in
potential life to the detriment of the pregnant woman's health at
any time during a pregnancy. In short, a partial birth abortion ban
without a health exception would fly in the face of the ultimate
goal of Roe and Casey-preventing the erection of insurmountable
barriers to a woman's access to abortion when such access may be
necessary for the preservation of her health. 4
A more difficult issue arises when a state regulation bans one
particular method of abortion. The Danforth decision arguably
suggests that a proscription on a pre-viability abortion method may
348. Supra Parts II.B.l.a.ii, II.B.2. These measures included an informed consent
requirement, a twenty-four hour waiting period, a parental notification requirement,
and related reporting requirements. Supra Part I.B.2.
349. Supra Part I.B.2.
350. Massie, supra note 4, at 357 and accompanying text.
351. These interests are the preservation of maternal health and the protection of
potential fetal life. Supra Part I.B.1.
352. Supra Part I.B.1.
353. Supra Part I.B.2.
354. See supra Part I.B.1, 2.
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be upheld as long as it contains a guaranty that a woman's health
will not be jeopardized. 5  The constitutional inquiry relating to
partial birth abortion then becomes: What if there is no medical
evidence supporting the necessity of the D&X procedure? What if
the D&X procedure is found to be only as safe as the D&E
procedure?
The Danforth Court held, specifically, that a ban on an abortion
method was unconstitutional if it imposed a risk on the woman's
health.356 Danforth also held that a primary rationale for striking
down the ban on the "saline amniocentesis" method of abortion
was that all other available alternatives were "significantly more
dangerous and critical for the woman. '35 7 Similarly, the Carhart
Court interpreted undue burden to mean situations when an abor-
tion regulation prevents a woman from obtaining the safest abor-
tion under the circumstances.3 5 8  Also, the Carhart majority
opinion discussed at length the fact that a health exception was
required in the Nebraska statute because there was significant
medical authority supporting the medical necessity of D&X for
some women under some circumstances.3 5 9 The Carhart majority,
therefore, adhered to the precautionary principle-that precisely
because there was substantial medical authority supporting the
medical necessity of D&X, the procedure should not be banned
without a health exception. 36° Like decisions before it, Carhart was
written with the health of the pregnant woman as its "paramount"
concern.
361
The Carhart Court did not, however, address the issue of what
the Court would have decided had there been no substantial evi-
dence in support of the medical necessity of D&X.362 Under Dan-
forth, a health exception arguably is not required if there are safe
alternatives to the banned abortion procedure. Moreover, al-
355. Supra Part I.B.3.
356. Supra Part I.B.3.
357. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 76 (1976).
358. Supra Part I.B.4.
359. Supra Part I.B.4.
360. Supra Part I.B.4.
361. Massie, supra note 4, at 357 and accompanying text.
362. Supra Part I.B.4. It is interesting to note that in his partial concurrence and
partial dissent in Danforth, Justice Stevens foreshadowed this issue in the partial birth
abortion debate. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 101-02
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting). He opined, "If two abortion procedures had been
equally accessible to Missouri women, in my judgment the United States Constitution
would not prevent the state legislature from outlawing the one it found to be less safe
even though its conclusion might not reflect a unanimous consensus of informed med-
ical opinion." Id. (emphasis added).
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though the banned procedure in Danforth was the most common
second trimester method of abortion at the time,363 D&X is one of
the least common methods of second trimester abortion-at most
comprising one percent of all second trimester abortions per-
formed in the United States, or approximately 0.01% of all abor-
tions performed annually.364 Thus, in a situation where there is not
substantial medical evidence supporting the necessity of D&X, a
ban on D&X without a health exception may be distinguished from
the ban upheld in Danforth.
This analysis is, however, faulty for several reasons. First, Dan-
forth was decided before Casey.36 5 The Casey Joint Opinion explic-
itly held that, in the facial challenge to the Pennsylvania statute, it
was irrelevant whether a provision would affect only a small group
of women.366 Rather, in determining whether an abortion regula-
tion imposes an undue burden, the focus should be on the group of
women, regardless of how small, who would be adversely affected
by the law.367 In fact, the Joint Opinion invalidated the spousal
notification provision in the Pennsylvania statute, even though it
affected only one percent of all women who obtained abortions.368
Under Casey, therefore, the mere fact that D&X may be medically
necessary for less than one percent of the women who obtain abor-
tions is irrelevant to a determination of whether a D&X ban should
have a health exception. Surely, a complete ban on a medical pro-
cedure such as D&X, with no health exception at all, would be an
undue burden on those women for whom the procedure is the
medically safest alternative.
Second, Carhart adopted a lenient test for determining whether
one abortion procedure is safer than another.369 Although it was
undisputed in Carhart that there were no medical studies docu-
menting the comparative safety of D&X and D&E,37° the majority
found this fact unimportant because there was substantial medical
evidence that D&X was medically necessary for some women in
some circumstances.371 The Court held, moreover, that universal
363. Supra Part I.B.3.
364. Supra Part I.A.
365. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
366. Supra Part I.B.2.
367. Supra Part I.B.2.
368. Supra Part I.B.2.
369. Supra Part I.B.4.
370. Supra Part I.B.4.
371. Supra Part I.B.4.
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agreement on a procedure's comparative benefits and risks is not
required, and that a procedure need not be absolutely necessary
for a woman's health.372 The majority reasoned that the "appropri-
ate medical judgment" of physicians will "often differ," and these
differences in medical opinion must be tolerated.373 Based on such
a lenient standard, even if advances in medicine improve the D&E
procedure, it is likely that it always will be easy to make a case that
D&X is comparatively safer than D&E for some women in some
circumstances, and therefore, necessary for the preservation of wo-
men's health under Roe and Casey.
Lastly, the Carhart majority did not make the analytical leap that
a health exception is not required in the absence of substantial evi-
dence that D&X is medically necessary.374 Rather, the majority
held only, that because there was such substantial evidence, a
health exception was necessarily required.375 It is quite possible,
then, that future courts will require a health exception in partial
birth abortion bans even when there is far less than substantial evi-
dence supporting the medical necessity of D&X. The argument
that the Carhart majority intended to require a health exception
only when there is substantial medical evidence supporting the ne-
cessity of D&X is further weakened by the fact that Justice
O'Connor felt compelled to make explicitly such an analytical leap
in her concurrence-a leap the majority refused to make.376
In sum, based on Supreme Court precedent and the Carhart de-
cision, it is highly unlikely that future courts will uphold a statute
banning partial birth abortion that does not contain an exception
for the health of the pregnant woman.
B. What a Health Exception Must Look Like to
Pass Constitutional Muster
1. States Should (But Are Not Required to) Draft Health
Exceptions to "Partial Birth" Abortion Bans That
Broadly Define "Health"
How broadly courts should interpret the meaning of "health" in
partial birth abortion bans is a separate analysis from how broadly
courts will likely interpret the meaning of "health."
372. Supra Part I.B.4.
373. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2612 (2000).
374. Supra Part I.B.4.
375. See supra Part I.B.4.
376. Supra Part II.A. for Justice O'Connor's full statement in this respect.
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As Justice Thomas argued in his dissenting opinion in the Su-
preme Court's denial of certiorari in Voinovich, precedent does not
require states to draft partial birth abortion bans which broadly de-
fine "health. '377 Except for the Sixth Circuit's decision in Voi-
novich, no decision discussed in Part II established a minimum
threshold of broadness that partial birth abortion bans must
meet.378 Rather, the decisions have provided that abortion statutes
may constitutionally incorporate a broad meaning of "health," and
that such broad interpretations do not render statutes void for
vagueness. 379 There have been no decisions, except for Voinovich,
that have invalidated a statute because it contained an unconstitu-
tionally narrow interpretation of "health. '38 ° For example, al-
though the Roe Court opined that the health of the woman should
be defined using diverse factors such as her physical, psychological,
and emotional health, the majority did not hold that such a broad
interpretation was required.381
The Casey Joint Opinion, however, encouraged a degree of
broadness in the meaning of "health," when it affirmed the Third
Circuit's finding that a health risk would qualify under the statute's
medical emergency provision if it could lead to "substantial and ir-
reversible" consequences.382 This requirement, in any event, did
not rise to a constitutional mandate that abortion statutes contain a
broad definition of "health." Although Carhart only briefly ad-
dressed the proper scope of a health exception in partial birth
abortion bans, the Court did in fact hold that a health exception
should be broad enough to cover health risks beyond those arising
out of the pregnancy itself.383 This finding suggests that the Court
will invalidate very narrow interpretations of the meaning of
"health," but it does not predict how broad an interpretation of
"health" the Court will uphold. At the very least, the majority's
language strongly suggests that it will interpret health exceptions to
include a woman's pre-existing health conditions. This interpreta-
tion is consistent with the broad definitions of "health" provided in
decisions such as Vuitch, Roe, Bolton, and Verniero.384 These deci-
sions interpreted "health" to include a wide variety of pre-existing
377. Supra Part II.B.l.b.
378. See supra Part II.B.l.a.
379. Supra Part II.B.l.a.
380. Supra Part II.B.l.a.
381. Supra Part II.B.l.a.i.
382. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880 (1992).
383. Supra Part I.B.4.
384. Supra Parts I.B.1, II.B.l.a.
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health conditions, including diabetes, schizophrenia, mental and
emotional ailments, and even health complications resulting from
living under bad economic conditions.385
The Carhart Court did not, however, address whether a health
exception must, should, or can cover mental, as well as physical,
health risks.386 Although the majority listed only physical health
risks of the D&E procedure, it did not hold that physical health
risks should be the only types of risks considered under a partial
birth abortion ban's health exception.38 7 Rather, the majority used
the physical health factors only as illustrative examples of the com-
parative risks of the D&X and D&E procedures. 388 There is,
therefore, no textual reason to suggest that courts should not con-
sider a woman's non-physical health risks under a partial birth
abortion ban's health exception. Nonetheless, neither Carhart nor
Casey established an affirmative rule that courts must broadly in-
terpret the meaning of "health" in abortion statutes.
There is, however, ample precedent strongly suggesting that
courts should require partial birth abortion bans to incorporate
broad definitions of "health," or at the very least, uphold such defi-
nitions.389 There have been several decisions that have advocated
in dicta that the meaning of "health" should be broadly defined;390
and there is an overwhelming amount of case law that suggests that
a health exception should incorporate (or at least be interpreted to
incorporate) a broad spectrum of health factors. 391 Broad interpre-
tations of "health" should be required especially in pre-viability
abortion proscriptions such as partial birth abortion bans, because
the state's compelling interests are at their weakest pre-viability.39
Doctors should be permitted to consider as broad a range of health
factors (if not broader factors) when determining if a pre-viability,
as opposed to a post-viability abortion, is necessary for a woman's
health.
The "paramount" concern of past abortion decisions-the pres-
ervation of maternal life and health-also militates in favor of a
385. Supra Part II.B.1.a. Given the controversial status of partial birth abortion,
however, the author believes that courts may be hesitant to consider non-medical
factors such as bad economic conditions as relevant health factors under an abortion
statute's health exception.
386. Supra Part II.B.l.a.i.
387. Supra Part I.B.4, II.B.l.a.i.
388. Supra Part I.B.4, II.B.l.a.i.
389. For a discussion of the case law, see supra Part II.B.1.a.
390. For a discussion of the case law, see supra Part II.B.l.a.
391. For a discussion of the case law, see supra Part II.B.l.a.
392. Supra Part I.B.2.
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broadly defined health exception.393 Courts such as those that de-
cided Roe, Bolton, Verniero, and Voinovich,394 did not arrive at
their decisions to embrace broad definitions of "health" without
considering, a range of issues. A woman's health, just as any per-
son's health, cannot be considered in a vacuum; rather, a woman's
health is affected by many different and competing forces. It is
arbitrary at best to, for instance, limit the health exception to phys-
ical health risks, and then claim that a health exception is ade-
quately protecting a woman's health. Although, as Justice Thomas
argued, a more narrow health exception may help prevent abuse of
a ban,395 it will do so at the great cost of inadequately protecting a
woman's health. The ultimate result of a narrow interpretation of
"health" will be an irrational world where a woman who develops a
serious heart problem will be permitted to have an abortion, but a
woman who develops a serious mental problem that will be wors-
ened by carrying the fetus to term will be banned from having an
abortion.
Although some courts and justices have pointed to the potential
for abuse of a very broad health exception, and how a narrow
health exception may prevent such abuse,396 these courts and jus-
tices have failed to point to any history of abuse resulting from
broad interpretations of health prior to the partial birth abortion
controversy. Many of the decisions supporting a broad interpreta-
tion of health were decided almost three decades ago. For exam-
ple, Vuitch was decided in 1971, Roe in 1973, and Bolton also in
1973.397 Prior to the partial birth abortion debate, there were no
significant cases challenging these or other decisions broadly inter-
preting "health." One is, therefore, compelled to speculate as to
why, now, in the midst of the partial birth abortion controversy,
there is such heated debate over whether, for example, there
should be a mental health exception in partial birth abortion
bans.398
In many ways, partial birth abortion is arguably different in kind
from earlier-term abortion. First, partial birth abortion is used less
often than earlier-term abortion.399 Second, late-term abortion
393. See Massie, supra note 4, at 357 and accompanying text.
394. Supra Part II.B.l.a.
395. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
396. See supra Part II.B.l.b.
397. United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973);
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
398. Compare supra Part II.B.L.a with Part II.B.l.b.
399. Supra note 19 and accompanying text.
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVIII
procedures are very complex to carry out. 00 Finally, some partial
birth abortions are performed at a point during pregnancy when
the state's interest in potential life is considered strongest.4 1 Pre-
cedent unequivocally requires, nonetheless, that a woman's health
must never, at any stage in a pregnancy, be put at risk.402 Yet
courts and judges have called for health exceptions to be limited to
physical health risks, even to permanent physical health risks.40 3
They have ignored the reality that "health" is far too multifaceted
to be limited in such a way, and as a result, have placed their sup-
port behind legislation that jeopardizes women's well-being. Not
including an exception for when a woman's mental, emotional, or
other kind of health is at risk is decidedly contrary to the goal of
preserving women's health.
In sum, courts should interpret the meaning of "health" broadly
to encompass verifiable mental, emotional, and physical health
risks, including pre-existing risks and risks arising out of the preg-
nancy. Broad interpretations of "health" are not, however, re-
quired by precedent. All that appears certain after Carhart is that
the definition of health must include pre-existing health conditions.
Courts may err on the side of caution and interpret health excep-
tions more narrowly to avoid risking abortion on demand. The
controversial nature of partial birth abortion may militate against
broad interpretations of health. If courts are to remain faithful to
the idea of abortion jurisprudence as an engine for the preserva-
tion of maternal health,40 4 however, they should interpret prece-
dent as commanding them to adopt a broad definition of the
meaning and scope of "health." In fact, because the weight of case
law interprets the meaning of "health" so broadly, courts attempt-
ing to restrict access to partial birth abortion may, instead, attempt
to restrict the reach of the health exception by requiring a serious
risk to a woman's health. This is the focus of the following section.
2. A Woman's Health Should at Least be at Serious Risk
Although a health exception should not contain a strict severity
requirement, the risk to the woman's health should be something
more than a mere incidental risk.
400. See Greenhouse, supra note 4, at Al.
401. Supra Parts I.B.1, 2.
402. See supra Part I.B.
403. See supra Part II.B.l.b.
404. See Massie, supra note 4, at 357 and accompanying text.
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Abundant case law, including Thornburgh and Bangerter, has
held that a doctor should not be required to make a trade-off be-
tween the woman's health and the life of the fetus.4 °5 In these
cases, courts have wisely held that requiring a health risk to meet a
particular level of severity fails to accord the state's interest in ma-
ternal health the fair weight precedent demands it receive.40 6 An
abortion technique should not be required to be indispensable to a
woman's health to qualify under a health exception. If this were
the case, health exceptions would start to look more like life excep-
tions. If a doctor is required to abide by strict severity require-
ments in health exceptions, he will be forced to disregard
important, but less critical, risks to his patient's health. As a result,
the doctor will be prevented from considering his duty to his pa-
tient as his "paramount concern. 40 7 Ironically, rather than limit-
ing the scope of the health exception,40 8  strict severity
requirements may, in fact, encourage abuse of the health excep-
tion. Physicians may over-exaggerate or lie about a patient's
health problems so that the patient can obtain an abortion under a
health exception.
Although strict severity requirements do, in fact, impose health
burdens on women, health exceptions with no severity requirement
at all also risk potentially dangerous consequences. In his dissent-
ing opinion in Thornburgh, Justice White, perhaps without in-
tending to do so, articulated a thoughtful compromise between
requiring a strict severity requirement and having none at all. The
abortion statute at issue in Thornburgh required that a woman be
exposed to "significantly greater medical risk. ' 40 9 Justice White ar-
gued that the word "significantly" could be interpreted to mean a
"meaningful," "non-negligible," or "appreciable" health risk.410
This interpretation provides a subtle compromise: although a strict
severity requirement may expose a woman to unnecessary health
risks, a requirement that a health risk be serious, meaningful, or
non-negligible, helps to ensure that the risk to maternal health is
legitimate and provides state legislatures with a mechanism for
protecting against frivolous health exception claims. Although a
broad definition of health may protect against irrational distinc-
405. Supra Part II.B.2.a.
406. Supra Part II.B.2.a.
407. Supra Part II.B.2.a; Massie, supra note 4, at 357 and accompanying text.
408. Supra Part II.B.2.b.
409. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747,
807 (White, J., dissenting).
410. Id.
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tions between what is and is not a health risk, the extreme of al-
lowing physicians to consider any and all health risks as serious
enough to qualify under a health exception raises the concern that
the exception will "swallow up the rule. 41 '
The Carhart majority addressed the debate over health excep-
tion severity requirements with a well-balanced compromise remi-
niscent of Justice White's Thornburgh dissent. The majority took a
middle-of-the-road approach by suggesting that, although a health
risk need not be strictly "necessary" for the preservation of a wo-
man's health, the risk should be at least a serious or significant
risk.412 Rather, as long as there is evidence that an abortion proce-
dure (e.g., D&X) is comparatively safer than another procedure
(e.g., D&E), for some women in some circumstances, access to
both procedures is constitutionally necessary for the preservation
of women's health.41 3 This is a generous standard, because it is
likely such evidence will be present in most cases.
In sum, following Carhart, courts should and likely will uphold
health exceptions that require a health risk to at least be serious or
significant. Because of the controversial nature of partial birth
abortion, legislatures may pass statutes with health exceptions that
have stricter severity requirements. It is difficult to predict what
courts will do when faced with constitutional challenges to such
statutes. Although there have been more decisions that have
found the trade-off unconstitutional than constitutional, the extent
to which courts will allow legislatures to go remains unclear.414
3. States Should Draft Health Exceptions with a Mixed
Subjective and Objective Standard
Ample case law supports the proposition that a health exception
can provide physicians adequate discretion to determine when a
partial birth abortion is necessary for a woman's health ("in appro-
411. A Woman's Choice-East Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 671. N.E.2d 104,112
(Sup. Ct. Ind. 1996) (Sullivan, J., dissenting); supra Part II.B.l.b.
412. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2616 (2000); supra Part II.B.2.c.
413. Supra Parts I.B.4, II.B.1.a.i.
414. There is insufficient case law to predict how future courts will handle a re-
quirement that a health risk be permanent (irreversible) in nature. Some of the health
risks of the D&X procedure listed by the Carhart Court as justifications for the neces-
sity of a health exception in a D&X ban were temporary health risks, including risks
relating to operating time, blood loss, risk of infection, and complications from bony
fragments. Supra Part II.B.2.c. To the contrary, the Voinovich court did not find a
constitutional problem with the language of the statute's health exception which re-
quired a "serious, non-temporary" health risk. Women's Med. Prof'l Corp. v. Voi-
novich, 130 F.3d 187, 190 (6th Cir. 1997).
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priate medical judgment"),415 while avoiding granting physicians
"unfettered discretion. '416
Starting with Roe, most courts have held that doctors should be
permitted to make good faith, subjective judgments as to whether
an abortion is necessary for a particular woman.417 These courts
have suggested that substantial evidence from the medical commu-
nity should not be required to show that a ban on an abortion pro-
cedure will put a woman's health at risk.418 The Casey Joint
Opinion, as well as the Vuitch and Bolton Courts, noted that it al-
ways has been common practice in the medical community for doc-
tors to use their best medical judgment to determine when a
certain medical procedure is necessary for a certain patient.419 A
purely objective approach, stripping a doctor of his discretion to
determine the necessity of an abortion for a woman's health, would
be impractical and unwise; a physician's good-faith medical deter-
mination would never be final, leaving him or her vulnerable to
potential lawsuits.42° There also is the risk that an objective stan-
dard will presume that all doctors and medical facilities are alike
with the same available resources, technology, and expertise. 421 Fi-
nally, as the Voinovich court pointed out, there is the danger that if
physicians know that they may be prosecuted for exercising their
good faith medical judgment, they may be wary of performing par-
tial birth abortions at all.422
Support for the adoption of a subjective interpretation of "ap-
propriate medical judgment ' 423 also can be found in the extensive
case law supporting a broad interpretation of the meaning and
scope of health.424 For example, Vuitch and Bolton support the
principle that a physician should be permitted to determine
whether an abortion is necessary by considering a spectrum of rele-
vant circumstances.425 These circumstances include all factors rele-
vant to the woman's well-being, such as her physical, psychological,
and mental health.426 A physician must, therefore, have the discre-
415. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
416. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
417. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
418. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
419. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
420. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
421. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
422. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
423. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164-65 (1973).
424. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
425. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
426. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
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tion to rely on his good faith medical judgment to consider all of
the circumstances in a given situation.
A doctor should not, however, have unbridled discretion to de-
termine when an abortion is necessary for a woman's health. A
balance must be struck. If physicians are not accountable to any
outside authority, the medical world will be as dangerous and im-
practical as a world where doctors are required to get approval for
every move they make. Some objective check must be in place to
avoid what Justice Thomas called "unfettered abortion on
demand. 42
7
In Roe, for example, the majority suggested that a physician does
not have unfettered discretion to determine whether an abortion is
necessary for a woman's health.428 Rather, if the "individual prac-
titioner" abuses his discretion, the Roe Court warned that objective
legal and "intra-professional" remedies would apply.4 29 Therefore,
even under Roe, which emphasized the physician's active involve-
ment in the abortion decision, sanctions based on objective medical
standards would be imposed if a physician abused his discretion.43 °
The Carhart Court, although it did not discuss the issue at length,431
also noted that a state is not required to grant physicians "unfet-
tered discretion" to determine when an abortion is necessary for
the woman's health.432 However, the majority did not address the
important issue of whether an objective or a subjective standard
should be applied in cases with no substantial medical authority
supporting the necessity of the D&X procedure. 433
In the future, courts will likely (and should) strike a reasonable
balance and adopt a mixed subjective and objective standard to
determine when a woman's health is at risk. This balance will
avoid the risk of rendering individual doctors impotent and vulner-
able to malpractice suits, while also avoiding the risk of creating a
system of abortion on demand. Courts should not require a show-
ing of substantial objective medical authority to prove that the
D&X procedure is constitutionally necessary for a woman's health.
A physician's discretion should, however, be weighed against an
objective medical standard that protects against the abuse of the
broad discretion granted.
427. Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597, 2652 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
428. Supra Parts II.B.3.a.
429. Roe, 410 U.S. at 166.
430. Supra Part II.B.3.a.
431. Supra Part II.B.3.c.
432. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. at 2613.
433. Supra Part II.B.3.c.
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CONCLUSION
Any attempt to predict how future courts will decide a given is-
sue is fraught with uncertainty. Although courts consider prece-
dent to be binding, precedent may be interpreted in any number of
ways, often colored by a judge's perceptions, biases, and world
view. Moreover, changes in political leadership in the executive or
legislative branches, changes in the composition of the Supreme
Court, unforeseen advances in medicine, and any number of other
high profile events could shape the outcomes of future court deci-
sions. Finally, because much of the case law regarding partial birth
abortion is new, and more established case law only recently has
been applied to challenges to partial birth abortion bans, any con-
clusions are necessarily conditional.
Uncertainty notwithstanding, the vast case law addressing abor-
tion rights permits a number of predictions about the future of the
health exception in partial birth abortion bans. First, after Carhart,
it is highly likely that future courts always will require a health ex-
ception in partial birth abortion bans. Second, although precedent
strongly suggests that the meaning and scope of the term "health"
should be broadly interpreted, courts are unlikely to require a
broad interpretation of the meaning of "health." Third, despite
policy arguments that strict severity requirements will impose un-
due health burdens on pregnant women, because of the controver-
sial nature of partial birth abortion, some courts may try to limit
access to partial birth abortion by requiring that a woman's health
be severely at risk. In any event, future courts undoubtedly will
uphold some sort of severity requirement. What still is too difficult
to predict is whether courts will adopt the thoughtful middle-
ground Carhart alternative, requiring that the risk to a woman's
health be at least a significant risk. Hopefully, courts will strike a
reasonable balance and adopt a mixed subjective and objective
standard to determine when a woman's health is at risk.
However courts decide to shape the future of the health excep-
tion in partial birth abortion bans, it is critical that they never lose
sight of the fact that no other state interest-regardless of how
compelling-should ever jeopardize a woman's health. Courts
commit a grave disservice to women when they put politics before
maternal health. Courts also commit a grave disservice to the Con-
stitution and preceding case law, especially Roe and Casey, when
they deny women the freedom to have an abortion for health rea-
sons. Chief Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit articulated the es-
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sential danger of a partial birth abortion ban without a health
exception:
The answer is that opponents of abortion do not think there
should be an exception for abortions that endanger a woman's
health. Life, yes, but not health. These [partial birth abortion]
statutes, remember, are not concerned with saving fetuses, with
protecting fetuses from a particularly cruel death, with protect-
ing the health of the woman, with protecting viable fetuses. ...
They are concerned with making a statement in an ongoing war
for public opinion, though an incidental effect may be to dis-
courage some late-term abortions. The statement is that fetal life
is more valuable than women's health.434
434. The Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 195 F.3d 857, 880-81 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (Pos-
ner, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added), vacated, Stenberg v. Carhart, 120 S. Ct. 2597
(2000).
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